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KEY POINTS
•	 Four	years	after	its	launch,	the	Eastern	Partnership	initiative	
has	created	frameworks	and	mechanisms	for	the	integration	
of	 Eastern	 Partnership	 countries	with	 the	 European	Union.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 partner	 countries	 have	 so	 far	 made	 little	
meaningful	progress	in	modernisation,	reforms	or	European	
integration.	 Since	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 was	
launched	 in	 2004,	 the	 situation	 in	 areas	 of	 key	 importance	
for	the	EU,	such	as	democratisation,	free-market	transforma-
tions,	 European	 integration,	 political	 stability	 and	 regional	
security,	 has	 not	 improved	 to	 a	 degree	 that	would	meet	 the	
Union’s	expectations.
•	 The	 Eastern	 Partnership	 initiative,	 which	 was	 intended	 to	
promote	the	integration	of	the	Eastern	European	and	South-
ern	Caucasus	countries	with	the	EU,	has	turned	out	to	be	pre-
dominantly	a	bureaucratic	 instrument	with	limited	political	
significance,	which	hardly	matches	the	European	union’s	am-
bitions	and	the	challenges	 it	 faces	 in	the	eastern	neighbour-
hood.	The	parties	concerned	are	more	interested	in	maintain-
ing	dialogue	than	in	achieving	tangible	progress	in	European	
integration.	This	shows	the	limits	of	the	EU’s	ability	to	influ-
ence	its	eastern	neighbourhood.
•	 Due	to	the	gap	between	the	expectations	of	the	partner	coun-
tries	and	their	elites	on	the	one	hand,	and	what	the	EU	has	to	
offer	on	the	other,	the	EaP	countries	have	shown	only	limited	
commitment	 to	 integration	with	 the	EU	and	 transformation	
along	EU	models.	These	are	long-term	processes	which	might	
generate	tangible	benefits	only	if	their	ultimate	aim	was	clear-
ly	defined,	which	is	not	the	case	(for	example,	it	is	unclear	if	
those	processes	are	supposed	to	lead	to	membership	in	the	Un-
ion,	or	to	a	different	form	of	integration).	Implementing	them	
would	entail	considerable	financial	and	political	costs,	which	
could	not	be	offset	by	the	current	level	of	support	from	the	EU.	
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Democratic	and	free-market	transformations	require	changes	
in	the	eastern	neighbours’	models	of	governance,	which	could	
undermine	the	position	of	the	current	dominant	business	and	
political	 groups	 by	 introducing	 political	 pluralism	 and	 free	
competition.	The	 local	elites,	however,	are	mostly	 interested	
in	defending	their	positions.	
•	 As	 on	many	 other	 issues,	 the	 European	Union	 has	 failed	 to	
develop	a	coherent	position	on	its	policy	towards	the	eastern	
neighbours.	This	applies	both	to	the	long-term	objectives	(cf.	
attitudes	 towards	 membership	 prospects	 for	 EaP	 countries	
or	 the	abolition	of	visa	regimes)	and	current	 issues	 (such	as	
the	signature	of	the	association	agreement	with	Ukraine,	the	
policy	of	sanctions	against	Belarus).	The	eastern	neighbour-
hood	plays	only	a	secondary	role	in	the	EU’s	political	agenda,	
especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Union’s	 internal	 problems	
(including	the	debate	on	the	future	of	the	Union,	the	need	to	
reform	the	EU’s	decision	making	processes,	and	the	financial	
crisis).	As	long	as	these	problems	remain	unsolved,	we	should	
not	expect	any	change	in	the	eastern	dimension	of	EU	policy.	
However,	despite	those	weaknesses,	the	Eastern	Partnership	
will	remain	the	main	framework	for	the	development	of	mu-
tual	relations.
•	 The	 policy	 of	 Russia	 poses	 a	 growing	 challenge	 to	 the	 EU’s	
policy	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood.	On	the	one	hand,	this	is	
due	 to	 the	 limited	dynamics	of	EU	actions,	and	on	 the	other	
to	 a	 change	 in	Moscow’s	 strategy.	Russia’s	Eurasian	 integra-
tion	 project	 (of	 which	 the	 customs	 union	with	 Belarus	 and	
Kazakhstan	 is	 the	 first	 phase)	 is	modelled	 on	 the	 European	
Union’s	modus operandi,	and	aims	at	integration	based	on	com-
mon	supranational	institutions	and	legislation.	Participation	
will	preclude	any	deeper	integration	with	the	EU,	and	so	the	
Russian	project	rivals	and	poses	a	challenge	to	European	poli-
cy.	Meanwhile,	Russia	continues	to	exploit	the	existing	politi-
cal	and	economic	dependencies	of	its	associates	(including	the	
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dependency	on	its	energy	resources),	and	is	prepared	to	offer	
its	 partners	financial	 support	without	preconditions	 related	
to	democratisation	or	economic	transformation.
•	 As	 the	 opportunities	 for	 stepping	 up	 political	 co-operation	
are	 limited,	 we	 should	 not	 expect	 any	 breakthrough	 in	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Eastern	
Partnership	countries.	In	order	to	increase	the	efficacy	of	Eu-
ropean	actions	and	avert	 the	ultimate	 failure	of	 the	Eastern	
Partnership	 initiative,	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 some	
tangible	progress,	especially	in	the	three	crucial	areas	of	eco-
nomic	 integration	 (the	 signature	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	
Deep	 And	 Comprehensive	 Free	 Trade	 Agreements,	 increas-
ing	 investments	 and	 trade	 exchange	 levels),	 visa	 liberalisa-
tion	(abolition	of	the	Schengen	visa	regime	for	those	countries	
that	have	made	the	most	progress)	and	the	development	of	the	
partners’	institutional	potential.	
•	 Despite	the	diplomatic	efforts	the	Union	has	made	so	far	(ne-
gotiating	 the	 Association	 Agreements,	 stimulating	 reforms)	
the	 EU’s	 economic	 and	 business	 relations	 with	 the	 eastern	
neighbourhood	have	not	intensified	considerably,	nor	has	the	
EU	 noticeably	 strengthened	 its	 position	 as	 the	 region’s	 eco-
nomic	partner.	The	present	paper	proposes	the	creation	of	an	
EU	investment	fund	for	the	Eastern	Partnership	as	a	way	to	
tackle	this	problem.	With	this	fund	in	place,	it	would	be	pos-
sible	to	step	up	European	investments	in	the	under-invested	
countries	of	the	region	and	enhance	the	attractiveness	of	the	
European	project	to	the	Eastern	Partnership	countries,	while	
at	 the	same	time	generating	concrete	financial	and	business	
gains	for	both	sides.
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INTrOducTION
The	 Eastern	 Partnership	 (EaP)	 initiative	 was	 intended	 to	 lend	
a	new	impulse	to	the	European	Union’s	relations	with	its	eastern	
neighbours,	namely	Ukraine,	Moldova,	Belarus,	Georgia,	Arme-
nia	and	Azerbaijan.	It	was	launched	in	2009	as	the	Eastern	dimen-
sion	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	policy.	It	has	brought	about	
a	series	of	changes	 in	the	Union’s	approach	to	the	region	and	in	
the	set	of	instruments	employed	by	the	EU.	However,	four	years	
on,	 the	dynamics	of	 the	EU’s	political	 relations	with	 its	 eastern	
neighbours	has	been	slowing	down,	especially	since	the	end	of	Po-
land’s	presidency	of	the	EU	Council	in	2011.	In	bilateral	relations,	
the	parties	have	mainly	been	focused	on	bureaucratic	activities,	
in	 particular	 on	 negotiating	 association	 agreements	 and	 agree-
ments	on	visa	 liberalisation	and	 facilitation.	However,	 these	ef-
forts	have	so	far	failed	to	produce	tangible	outcomes	in	the	form	of	
agreements	signed	and	implemented,	nor	have	they	produced	any	
qualitative	change	 in	mutual	political	relations.	 In	 the	multilat-
eral	dimension,	the	activities	of	Eastern	Partnership	institutions,	
such	as	Euronest,	 the	Conference	of	 the	Regional	and	Local	Au-
thorities	(CORELAP)	and	the	Civil	Society	Forum,	have	also	failed	
to	achieve	the	outcomes	expected,	and	the	activities	of	the	institu-
tions	themselves	have	been	almost	invisible	to	the	general	public.	
Finally,	the	effectiveness	of	the	support	programmes	financed	by	
the	EU	has	been	called	into	question,	as	their	impact	on	the	situa-
tion	in	the	partner	countries	has	been	limited.
In	addition,	internal	developments	in	the	partner	countries	have	
been	a	cause	for	concern	for	the	EU.	One	the	one	hand,	positive	
examples	of	change	have	been	emphasised.	Moldova,	for	instance,	
has	 made	 considerable	 progress	 towards	 rapprochement	 with	
the	EU	over	the	last	four	years;	in	October	2012	the	EU	Commis-
sioner	for	Enlargement	Štefan	Füle	said	that	the	country	should	
be	 granted	membership	 prospects1.	 Georgia	 is	 another	 positive	
1	 Statement	by	Štefan	Füle,	European	Commissioner	for	Enlargement	and	Eu-
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example;	the	country	underwent	a	democratic	change	of	govern-
ment	as	a	result	of	the	parliamentary	elections	in	October	2012.	
On	the	other	hand,	however,	criticism	has	been	mounting	in	the	
EU	over	the	erosion	of	democratic	standards	in	Belarus,	Azerbai-
jan,	and	in	particular	Ukraine.	The	Eastern	Partnership	countries	
have	also	 failed	to	make	substantial	progress	 in	economic	mod-
ernisation	and	European	integration.	This	has	led	to	criticism	of	
the	inefficacy	of	the	Union’s	actions,	and	has	been	raised	as	an	ar-
gument	against	stepping	up	European	involvement	in	the	region.
The	partner	countries	are	also	disappointed	with	the	EU’s	policy.	
From	 their	 point	 of	 view,	what	 the	European	Union	 offers	 does	
not	 match	 their	 needs.	 Facing	 deteriorating	 economic	 condi-
tions,	the	EaP	countries	are	unable	to	bear	the	considerable	costs	
of	transformations	and	integration	with	the	EU,	especially	since	
the	ultimate	objective	of	such	integration	has	not	been	clearly	de-
fined.	Should	it	consist	in	some	form	of	closer	co-operation	among	
neighbours,	or	economic	integration	based	on	a	free	trade	area?	
Or	perhaps	the	partner	countries	could	be	granted	membership	
prospects	at	the	end	of	the	road?	
Unlike	the	Central	European	countries,	which	in	the	1990s	staked	
everything	 on	 Euro-Atlantic	 integration,	 European	 integration	
is	not	the	only	option	for	the	Eastern	European	states.	Other	ac-
tors,	 including	Russia	 in	particular,	occupy	 important	positions	
in	 their	 foreign	 policies.	 Russia	 has	 initiated	 its	 own	 Eurasian	
integration	project,	which	 is	 intended	to	be	a	rival	undertaking	
to	European	integration	and	poses	a	geopolitical	challenge	to	the	
European	Union.
Another	problem	concerns	the	major	changes	that	have	been	oc-
curring	within	the	European	Union,	which	indirectly	create	a	new	
context	for	its	relations	with	the	Eastern	Partnership	countries.	
ropean	Neighbourhood	Policy,	at	the	EU-Moldova	Forum	in	Berlin,	Germany,	
22	October	2012,	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-753_en.htm
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Those	changes	are	related	mainly	to	the	Euro	crisis	and,	more	im-
portantly,	the	debate	on	the	future	of	the	Union	and	its	possible	
division	 into	 several	 circles	or	 speeds	of	 integration.	The	 result	
is	that	the	EU	member	states	have	been	losing	interest	in	foreign	
policy,	and	certainly	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood.	
In	this	context,	it	is	legitimate	to	ask	questions	about	the	extent	to	
which	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	the	Eastern	Part-
nership	have	brought	 the	Union	closer	 to	achieving	 its	declared	
objectives	in	the	relations	with	eastern	neighbours.	What	is	the	
underlying	 cause	 of	 the	 dwindling	 involvement	 and	 declining	
interest	 in	achieving	real	progress	 in	integration?	How	may	the	
events	 that	have	been	dominating	 the	political	agenda	–	 i.e.	 the	
EU’s	financial	 crisis,	 the	debate	on	 the	 future	of	 the	Union,	but	
also	the	political	processes	taking	place	within	the	partner	coun-
tries	–	affect	the	future	of	mutual	relations?
The	present	paper	begins	with	a	presentation	of	the	basic	objec-
tives	 and	 assumptions	 of	 the	 European	 Union’s	 eastern	 policy.	
It	then	goes	on	to	discuss	developments	in	the	individual	Eastern	
Partnership	 countries	 since	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 European	Neigh-
bourhood	Policy,	and	attempts	to	answer	the	question	of	to	what	
extent	the	social,	political	and	economic	changes	taking	place	in	
the	region	are	in	line	with	the	Union’s	expectations.	The	next	part	
presents	 the	 approaches	 towards	 European	 integration	 of	 the	
partner	countries	and	their	political	elites.	Then	the	paper	goes	
on	to	discuss	the	most	important	political	processes	that	will	af-
fect	the	future	development	of	the	eastern	dimension	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Neighbourhood	Policy	–	the	financial	crisis	in	the	Union	
and	the	economic	crisis	in	the	partner	countries,	the	debate	on	the	
future	of	the	EU	and	the	policy	of	Russia.	The	conclusion	outlines	
actions	that	can	be	taken	within	the	framework	of	the	EU’s	East-
ern	policy	at	this	stage.
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I. EvOluTION Of ThE Eu’S aPPrOach  
TO ITS EaSTErN NEIghbOurhOOd
1. Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
The	shape	of	EU	policy	 towards	 the	countries	of	Eastern	Europe	
and	the	Southern	Caucasus2	has	evolved	gradually	since	the	1990s.	
In	the	beginning,	those	countries	were	not	regarded	as	the	Euro-
pean	Union’s	neighbourhood.	Rather,	they	were	seen	as	belonging	
to	 the	post-Soviet	area	 in	which	Russia	played	a	dominant	role3.	
The	first	stage	 in	 the	evolution	of	 the	EU	policy	 instruments	ad-
dressing	 the	 countries	which	 are	now	participating	 in	 the	East-
ern	 Partnership	 consisted	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 Partnership	 and	
Co-operation	Agreements	 (PCA),	which	were	signed	with	all	 the	
former	Soviet	countries	except	 for	 the	Baltic	 states	and	Belarus.	
The	PCAs	took	effect	in	the	late	1990s,	and	laid	down	the	principles	
of	economic	co-operation	and	created	the	frameworks	for	political	
dialogue.	They	also	envisaged	a	situation	where	the	partner	coun-
tries	would	gradually	align	themselves	to	European	standards,	al-
though	the	provisions	on	this	were	not	very	specific	and	have	not	
been	regarded	as	mandatory.	The	PCAs	continue	to	constitute	the	
treaty	basis	for	the	EU’s	relations	with	the	eastern	neighbourhood.
2. European Neighbourhood Policy
The	Eastern	European	countries	became	direct	neighbours	of	the	
Union	after	the	Central	European	states	jointed	the	EU	in	the	2004	
wave	of	enlargement.	That	geopolitical	change	led	to	the	launch	
of	a	new	instrument	in	EU	policy	–	the	European	Neighbourhood	
Policy	 (ENP),	 which	 covered	 the	 sixteen	 countries	 in	 Eastern	
2	 In	the	present	paper,	the	term	“Eastern	Europe”	refers	to	the	countries	par-
ticipating	 in	 the	Eastern	Partnership	 initiative,	 i.e.	Armenia,	Azerbaijan,	
Belarus,	Georgia,	Moldova	and	Ukraine.
3	 Katarzyna	Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,	Integration	or	imitation?	EU	policy	towards	its	
Eastern	Neighbours,	OSW	Studies,	No	36,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	Warsaw	
2011,	p.	29,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_36_en.pdf.
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Europe	 and	 the	 Southern	Mediterranean4.	 The	 ENP	 introduced	
a	significant	change	in	the	Union’s	attitude	towards	Eastern	Eu-
rope.	The	EU	started	to	recognise	the	region	as	its	direct	neigh-
bourhood,	 and	 consequently	 it	 became	necessary	 for	 the	Union	
to	 step	 up	 its	 political	 and	 financial	 involvement	 there.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	 a	 separation	 was	 introduced	 in	 EU	 policy	 between	
the	Eastern	European	countries	 and	Russia,	which	did	not	par-
ticipate	in	the	ENP5.	This	meant	a	significant	change	in	the	EU’s	
perception	of	 the	countries	of	 the	region,	which	were	no	 longer	
seen	 as	 the	Russian-dominated	post-Soviet	 area,	 but	 as	 the	Un-
ion’s	neighbours	with	prospects	of	rapprochement	with	the	EU6.	
The	primary	objective	of	the	ENP	was	defined	as	“strengthening	
the	stability,	security	and	prosperity”	of	 the	Union	and	its	east-
ern	neighbours,	building	closer	mutual	relations,	and	achieving	
economic	and	political	integration.	The	EU	also	committed	itself	
to	 stepping	up	efforts	 to	 resolve	 regional	 conflicts7.	The	scale	of	
EU	involvement	became	conditional	on	its	neighbours	respecting	
democratic	values,	human	rights,	the	principles	of	market	econo-
my	and	sustainable	development.	It	was	emphasised	that	the	ENP	
had	not	been	conceived	of	as	an	instrument	of	EU	enlargement,	
although	membership	 prospects	were	 not	 ruled	 out.	 The	 scope	
of	 the	ENP	was	 expanded	 in	 2007	 to	 include	 the	 strengthening	
4	 Communication	from	the	European	Commission,	European	Neighbourhood	
Policy	strategy	paper,	12.05.2004,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strat-
egy/strategy_paper_en.pdf
5	 Russia	was	not	interested	in	participating	in	the	ENP.	The	EU	and	Russia	co-
operate	within	the	framework	of	the	so-called	Common	Spaces.	In	2010	the	
parties	 reached	 agreement	 on	 the	 Partnership	 for	Modernisation,	which	
was	 supposed	 to	 lend	 a	 new	 impulse	 to	 the	 EU-Russia	 relations.	 See	 the	
Joint	Statement	on	 the	Partnership	 for	Modernisation	EU-Russia	Summit	
31	 May-1	 June	 2010,	 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf
6	 One	of	the	objectives	of	the	ENP	was	to	“prevent	the	emergence	of	new	di-
viding	lines	between	the	enlarged	EU	and	its	neighbours”.	European	Neigh-
bourhood	Policy	strategy	paper,	p.	3,	op. cit.
7	 The	frozen	conflicts	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood	include:	Moldova’s	con-
flict	with	the	breakaway	region	of	Transnistria;	Georgia’s	conflict	with	the	
breakaway	regions	of	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia;	and	the	conflict	between	
Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	over	the	Nagorno-Karabakh	region.	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
13
13
of	 trade	 and	 economic	 co-operation	 (through	 the	 launch	 of	 ne-
gotiations	on	free	trade	areas),	starting	co-operation	on	mobility	
(negotiations	on	visa	facilitations	and	readmission),	stepping	up	
sectoral	co-operation,	and	introducing	an	option	for	neighbours	
to	participate	in	the	EU	programmes	and	agencies8.	
3. The Eastern Partnership
Maintaining	a	single	framework	for	the	disparate	neighbourhoods	
in	the	east	and	in	the	south	turned	out	to	be	difficult.	As	a	result,	
two	regional	dimensions	of	 the	ENP	were	defined:	 the	Union	 for	
the	Mediterranean,	covering	ten	North	African	and	Middle	East-
ern	countries	in	2008,	and	the	Eastern	Partnership	for	Eastern	Eu-
rope	and	the	Southern	Caucasus	in	2009.	This	move	was	influenced	
also	by	internal	rivalry	between	those	EU	member	states	that	were	
interested	in	stepping	up	EU	involvement	in	the	south,	and	those	
seeking	a	greater	EU	presence	in	the	east.	Launched	in	a	period	of	
economic	prosperity	in	the	EU,	the	two	regional	dimensions	were	
also	 intended	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Union’s	 position	 as	 a	 global	 ac-
tor.	The	objectives	of	ensuring	stability	 in	 the	neighbourhood,	 in	
which	the	involvement	of	the	United	States	was	decreasing,	and	of	
strengthening	EU	influence,	reflected	the	Union’s	faith	in	its	own	
power	and	an	ambition	to	play	a	key	role	in	international	politics.	
The	principal	objective	of	the	EaP	was	defined	as	“the	political	as-
sociation	and	economic	integration”	of	the	EU	and	the	interested	
partner	countries9.	In	practice,	that	was	supposed	to	mean	creating	
a	common	free	trade	area,	as	well	as	the	integration	of	the	partner	
8	 Communication	from	the	European	Commission,	Strengthening	the	Euro-
pean	Neighbourhood	Policy,	4	December	2006,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf
	 Communication	from	the	Commission,	A	Strong	European	Neighbourhood	Pol-
icy,	5	December	2007,	http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf
9	 Joint	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Prague	 Eastern	 Partnership	 Summit,	 Prague,	
7.05.2009,	p.	6,	http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/east-
ern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf
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countries’	economies	with	the	European	market.	However,	still	no	
decisions	were	taken	on	granting	(or	refusing)	membership	pros-
pects	to	the	EaP	countries.	On	that	occasion,	the	original	objectives	
of	 the	ENP	were	 also	 restated	 as	 stimulating	 the	modernisation	
and	development	of	the	partner	countries	in	line	with	European	
models,	and	promoting	co-operation	based	on	democratic	and	free-
market	values.	The	 set	of	EU	policy	 instruments	was	expanded,	
and	the	policy	itself,	which	until	then	had	been	implemented	on	
a	bilateral	basis,	was	extended	to	include	a	multilateral	dimension	
aimed	not	only	at	building	closer	relations	between	the	EU	and	the	
region,	but	also	among	the	individual	Eastern	European	countries.	
The	 main	 focus	 was	 placed	 on	 negotiating	 new	 kinds	 of	 treaty	
agreements	(Association	Agreements	and	Deep	And	Comprehen-
sive	Free	Trade	Area	Agreements	that	would	replace	the	PCAs	dat-
ing	back	to	the	1990s)	and	developing	positive	co-operation	(eco-
nomic	 integration,	 EU	 support	 for	 reforms	 and	modernisations,	
measures	to	strengthen	civil	society,	etc.).	In	doing	so,	the	EU	tried	
to	avoid	problems	that	could	obstruct	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
initiative,	 such	as	possible	 confrontation	with	Russia,	 as	well	 as	
issues	such	as	regional	security	and	the	regulation	of	frozen	con-
flicts	(which	de facto	were	not	included	into	the	EaP	scope	but	were	
covered	by	the	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy).	
4. The ENP after the ‘Arab Spring’
In	the	period	after	2004,	the	ENP	was	implemented	in	a	relatively	
stable	political	environment	unaffected	by	unpredictable	crises10	
that	could	undermine	this	policy.	In	the	east,	the	Russian	inter-
vention	in	Georgia	was	the	only	exception,	which	to	some	extent	
influenced	 the	 Union’s	 decision	 to	 launch	 the	 Eastern	 Partner-
ship.	The	‘Arab	spring’	in	early	2011	and	the	toppling	of	regimes	in	
Tunisia,	Egypt	and	Libya,	as	well	as	the	protests	in	the	other	coun-
tries	 of	 Northern	 Africa,	 fundamentally	 changed	 the	 political	
10	 The	protracted	 Israeli-Palestinian	 conflict	 and	 the	 instability	 in	Lebanon	
are	lasting	features	of	the	political	conditions	in	the	Middle	East.
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context	of	the	ENP	and	forced	the	EU	to	make	more	changes	to	its	
policies	 towards	 the	neighbours.	Those	 events	 called	 into	ques-
tion	 the	EU’s	original	approach	 to	 the	southern	neighbourhood,	
where	 the	priority	had	been	 to	ensure	stability	and	security	by	
co-operating	with	the	local	authoritarian	regimes	at	the	expense	
of	 support	 for	 democratisation	 or	 civil	 society.	Meanwhile,	 au-
thoritarian	tendencies	were	also	on	the	rise	in	the	eastern	neigh-
bourhood.	As	a	result,	the	EU	started	to	make	modifications	to	its	
neighbourhood	policy;	these	did	not	considerably	alter	the	basic	
assumptions	of	that	policy,	but	were	primarily	aimed	at	improv-
ing	the	effectiveness	of	 its	 instruments.	The	changes	concerned	
in	particular:	(1)	adopting	a	more	varied	approach	to	better	take	
into	 account	 each	 neighbour’s	 local	 conditions	 and	 aspirations	
with	regard	to	the	EU;	(2)	strengthening	conditionality	by	intro-
ducing	the	‘more	for	more’	rule	which	made	the	scale	of	EU	sup-
port	dependent	of	progress	in	European	integration	and	reforms;	
(3)	attaching	greater	significance	to,	and	becoming	more	involved	
in,	co-operation	with	civil	society11.
*	*	*
Still,	 the	 Union	 has	 been	 largely	 reactive	 in	 implementing	 its	
neighbourhood	 policy:	 changes	 were	 always	 introduced	 in	 re-
sponse	to	developments,	and	never	anticipated	events.	The	ENP	
was	launched	because	of	the	EU’s	eastward	enlargement	and	the	
pressure	from	the	new	Central	European	members.	In	the	case	of	
the	Eastern	Partnership,	one	of	the	impulses	came	from	the	Rus-
sian	intervention	in	Georgia	which	threatened	to	destabilise	the	
entire	Southern	Caucasus,	and	indirectly,	also	from	the	Russian-
Ukrainian	gas	crisis	in	the	early	2009.	Finally,	the	ENP	reform	af-
ter	2011	was	a	consequence	of	the	‘Arab	Spring’,	over	the	outbreak	
of	which	the	EU	had	had	no	influence.
11	 Rafał	Sadowski,	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	Package	–	Conclusions	for	
the	Eastern	Partners’,	OSW Commentary,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	25	May	
2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/
european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn
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II. lITTlE chaNgE IN ThE EaSTErN 
NEIghbOurhOOd 
The	arrest	and	conviction	in	2011	of	Ukraine’s	former	prime	min-
ister	Yulia	Tymoshenko	triggered	an	intensive	debate	on	the	con-
dition	of	democracy	in	the	countries	of	Eastern	Europe.	The	EaP	
countries	were	criticised	for	the	rise	of	undemocratic	tendencies:	
this	refers	not	only	to	Ukraine,	but	also	to	Georgia,	as	well	as	Bela-
rus	and	Azerbaijan,	 the	 two	EaP	countries	regarded	as	authori-
tarian12.	In	the	EU’s	perception,	the	erosion	of	democracy	in	the	
eastern	 neighbourhood	 became	 even	 more	 pre-eminent	 when	
viewed	against	 the	background	of	 the	 changes	 triggered	by	 the	
‘Arab	Spring’	in	North	Africa.
Developments	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood	since	the	launch	of	
the	ENP	in	2004	have	hardly	met	the	EU’s	expectations.	Measured	
by	the	criteria	of	the	main	objectives	of	EU	policy,	i.e.	stability	and	
regional	 security,	 democratic	 and	 free-market	 transformations,	
and	integration	with	the	EU,	the	situation	in	the	countries	of	the	
region	has	not	changed	considerably,	and	has	worsened	in	some	
respects.	 Analysis	 of	 the	 various	 criteria	 and	 indexes	 describ-
ing	the	change	in	those	areas	since	2004	shows	that	the	growing	
12	 Tadeusz	 Iwański,	 Rafał	 Sadowski,	 Anna	 Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	 Artur	
Ciechanowicz,	The	crisis	in	EU/Ukraine	relations	surrounding	Tymoshen-
ko,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	9	May	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-05-09/crisis-eu/ukraine-relations-sur-
rounding-tymoshenko
	 Kamil	Kłysiński,	Rafał	Sadowski,	Belarus’s	diplomatic	war	with	the	Euro-
pean	Union,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	29	February	2012,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-02-29/belaruss-diplomat-
ic-war-european-union
	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	Eurovision:	Azerbaijan’s	failure	to	promote	itself,	
Eastweek,	 Centre	 for	Eastern	Studies,	 30	May	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-05-30/eurovision-azerbaijan-s-failure-to-
promote-itself
	 Georgia:	 Police	 break	 up	 protest	 aimed	 at	 preventing	 Independence	 Day	
parade,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	1	June	2011,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-06-01/georgia-police-break-protest-
aimed-preventing-independence-day-parade
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involvement	of	the	EU	and	the	development	of	its	bureaucratic	in-
struments	has	failed	to	bring	about	any	real	improvements	in	the	
neighbourhood,	 revealing	 the	 limits	of	 the	EU’s	 ability	 to	 influ-
ence	the	situation	in	the	EaP	countries.	
1. Democracy and regional security
None	of	the	six	EaP	countries	are	democratic	states	by	European	
standards.	According	to	various	rankings,	they	are	either	partly	
democratic	 (Moldova,	 Ukraine,	 Georgia,	 Armenia)	 or	 authori-
tarian	 regimes	 (Belarus	 and	Azerbaijan).	None	 of	 the	 countries	
have	 reported	 considerable	 improvement	 in	 this	 respect	 since	
2004,	and	in	most	of	them	the	situation	has	hardly	changed	at	all.	
Ukraine,	 where	 the	 situation	 deteriorated	 markedly	 after	 2010	
following	 a	period	of	 growing	political	 freedoms	after	 the	 2004	
Orange	Revolution,	is	one	of	the	negative	examples.
Figure 1.	Democracy	Index	(Economist	Intelligence	Unit)
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P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
13
18
country freedom in the world(1 = free – 7 = not free)
year 2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013
PR CL
sta
tu
s
PR CL
sta
tu
s
PR CL
sta
tu
s
PR CL
sta
tu
s
PR CL
sta
tu
s
PR CL
armenia 4 4 PF 5↓ 4 PF 6↓ 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 5↑ 4
azerbaijan 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5
belarus 6 6 NF 7↓ 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6
georgia 4 4 PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 4↓ 4↓ PF 4 3↑ PF 4 3 PF 3↑ 3
Moldova 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 4↓ PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 3 3 PF 3 3
ukraine 4 4 F 3↑ 2↑ F 3 2 PF 3 3↓ PF 4↓ 3 PF 4 3
PR	–	political	rights	 	 F	–	free	 	 	 NF	–	not	free
CL	–	civil	liberties	 	 PF	–	partly	free	 	
↑	–	improvement	
↓	–	decline
Source:	Freedom	House	Foundation,	http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2013
The	absence	of	progress	in	democratisation	is	visible	in	how	elec-
tions	have	been	held	in	the	region’s	countries	over	recent	years.	
The	character	of	ballots	 is	one	of	the	most	 important	criteria	 in	
assessing	the	condition	of	democratic	institutions,	and	the	EU	has	
made	its	activities	in	the	neighbourhood	conditional	on	such	as-
sessments.	Elections	held	in	all	the	EaP	countries	after	2008	were	
marred	 by	more	 or	 less	 serious	 infringements	 of	 voting	 proce-
dures.	This	refers	to	technical	issues	and	the	organisation	of	elec-
tions,	but	also,	more	importantly,	to	respect	(or	lack	thereof)	for	
the	fundamental	principle	of	freedom	of	choice.	A	positive	exam-
ple	comes	from	Georgia,	and	especially	its	most	recent	parliamen-
tary	elections	held	on	1	October	2012,	when	a	democratic	change	
of	government	took	place,	and	the	OSCE	recognised	the	election	
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as	 free,	 despite	 some	 shortcomings13.	The	 situation	has	 also	 im-
proved	noticeably	in	Moldova,	where	the	OSCE	positively	assessed	
the	last	parliamentary	elections	in	201014	and	commended	it	as	an	
improvement	 over	 the	 rigged	 elections	 of	April	 2009.	OSCE	 re-
ports	have	been	quite	positive	about	the	elections	in	Armenia	in	
recent	years,	even	though	they	have	pointed	to	a	number	of	short-
comings,	as	a	result	of	which	the	elections	could	not	be	recognised	
as	fully	democratic.	Ukraine,	on	the	other	hand,	has	experienced	
a	relapse,	best	exemplified	by	the	parliamentary	elections	in	Oc-
tober	2012,15	which	received	much	more	criticism	from	the	OSCE	
observers	than	the	previous	ballot	in	2010.	In	the	remaining	two	
countries,	 i.e.	Azerbaijan	and	Belarus,	none	of	 the	general	elec-
tions	of	recent	years	met	the	criteria	of	a	free	and	democratic	vote.
Nor	has	there	been	hardly	any	progress	in	terms	of	regional	se-
curity.	In	none	of	the	four	regional	conflicts	has	the	situation	im-
proved;	on	the	contrary,	all	have	remained	highly	volatile.	In	the	
cases	of	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	in	Georgia,	the	feasibility	of	
a	peaceful	resolution	has	diminished	considerably	as	a	result	of	the	
Georgian-Russian	war	in	August	2008,	after	which	the	two	coun-
tries	broke	off	diplomatic	relations.	The	status	of	the	Armenian-
Azeri	conflict	over	Nagorno-Karabakh	also	remains	very	volatile,	
and	 a	 new	outbreak	 of	 armed	 operations	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out16.	
13	 Office	for	Democratic	Institutions	and	Human	Rights,	Georgia	Parliamen-
tary	Elections	1	October	2012,	OSCE/ODIHR	Election	Observation	Mission,	
Final	Report,	Warsaw,	2012,	http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98399
14	 Office	for	Democratic	Institutions	and	Human	Rights, Republic	of	Moldova	Ear-
ly	Parliamentary	Elections	28	November	2010,	OSCE/ODIHR	Election	Observa-
tion	Mission,	Final	Report,	Warsaw,	2011,	http://www.osce.org/odihr/75118
15	 Office	for	Democratic	Institutions	and	Human	Rights,	Ukraine	Parliamen-
tary	Elections	28	October	2012,	OSCE/ODIHR	Election	Observation	Mission,	
Final	Report,	Warsaw,	2013,	http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98578
16	 Lawrence	Sheets,	A	‘Frozen	Conflict’	That	Could	Boil	Over,	The International 
Herald Tribune,	8	March	2012.	
	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 Krzysztof	 Strachota,	 ‘Nagorno-Karabakh	 –	 con-
flict	unfreezing’,	OSW Commentary,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	26	October	
2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-10-26/
nagornokarabakh-conflict-unfreezing
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The	countries	involved,	especially	Azerbaijan,	have	been	arming	
themselves	more	intensively	in	recent	years,	and	the	number	of	
incidents	 in	the	border	areas	has	also	 increased,	with	63	people	
killed	between	the	beginning	of	2011	and	mid-201217.	The	relative	
stabilisation	of	the	Transnistrian	conflict	in	mid-2012,	when	Chis-
inau	and	the	breakaway	region	resumed	contacts,	hardly	consti-
tuted	 a	 breakthrough.	 Transnistria	 has	 subsequently	 adopted	
a	more	rigid	stance	in	the	peace	talks	with	Moldova	in	mid-2012,	
as	a	result	of	which	the	negotiations	are	stuck	in	stalemate,	and	
an	increased	number	of	incidents	between	the	two	sides	has	been	
reported	since	the	spring	of	201318.	The	risk	of	the	conflict	escalat-
ing	would	increase,	particularly	if	real	rapprochement	occurred	
between	Chisinau	and	the	EU;	this	would	threaten	the	geopoliti-
cal	interests	of	Tiraspol’s	main	protector,	Russia,	which	could	use	
the	conflict	instrumentally	to	block	the	progress	of	Moldova’s	Eu-
ropean	integration.	Russia	has	been	continually	active	in	Transn-
istria	 in	 the	field	of	security	 (for	example,	 in	2012	 it	 stepped	up	
control	of	Transnistria’s	institutions	of	force,	and	incidents	have	
been	reported	in	the	border	area	in	2013)19,	which	shows	that	such	
a	scenario	is	indeed	possible.
Despite	 the	 European	 Union’s	 declared	 ambitions,	 its	 impact	
on	the	resolution	of	any	of	these	conflicts	has	been	 limited.	The	
17	 Joshua	Kucera,	Serious	Escalation	 in	Armenia-Azerbaijan	Violence	Greets	
Clinton,	Eurasianet.org,	http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65501
	 More	than	30	people	died	in	2012	alone	(source:	Agence	France	Press).
18	 For	 example,	 in	April	 2013	 three	Moldovan	police	 officers	were	 beaten	 in	
Bender	by	people	associated	with	the	Transnistrian	security	services;	the	
Transnistrian	authorities	staged	a	blockade	of	the	Chisinau-controlled	pris-
on	in	Bender;	and	the	Transnistrian	authorities	unsuccessfully	attempted	
to	establish	a	customs	control	post	 in	the	village	of	Varniţa	 located	in	the	
security	zone	and	controlled	by	Moldova	(for	more	information	on	the	latter	
incident,	 see	Evgeniy	 Sholar,	Nikolai	 Pakholnitsky,	Tatiana	Gyska,	Voen-
naya	gra		«Varnitsa»,	Kommersant Moldova,	27	April	2013,	http://www.kom-
mersant.md/node/16593).
19	 Wojciech	 Konończuk,	Witold	 Rodkiewicz,	 Could	 Transnistria	 block	Mol-
dova’s	 integration	 with	 the	 EU?,	 OSW Commentary,	 Centre	 for	 Eastern	
Studies,	 23.10.2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2012-10-23/could-transnistria-block-moldovas-integration-eu
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reasons	include	the	EU’s	weak	political	position	in	the	region,	and	
the	 fact	 that	 the	Union	 lacks	 effective	 instruments	 to	 influence	
the	parties	involved	(for	example,	in	contrast	to	the	Western	Bal-
kans,	where	membership	prospects	and	the	ambition	of	all	coun-
tries	in	the	region	to	integrate	with	the	EU	were	among	the	most	
important	instruments).	
2. Free-market transformations and economic 
development 
Economic	and	social	transformations	in	the	EaP	countries	present	
a	mixed	picture.	None	of	the	countries	have	made	the	substantial	
progress	which	would	meet	 the	EU’s	expectations.	Transforma-
tions	of	the	system	of	government	in	the	Eastern	European	coun-
tries	are	slow	and	have	stumbled	on	many	more	problems	than	
was	the	case	in	the	Central	European	countries	which	became	EU	
members	in	2004	and	2007.	
The	 Bertelsmann	 Foundation	 Transformation	 Index,	 which	
measures	the	condition	of	democracy	and	the	progress	of	market	
economy	reforms,	points	to	two	positive	examples	of	Moldova	and	
Georgia,	 the	 two	countries	 that	did	make	considerable	progress	
between	2003	and	2012.	 In	 the	case	of	Georgia	 this	 inter alia	 re-
flects	the	democratic	changes	that	occurred	after	the	2003	‘Rose	
Revolution’;	and	in	the	case	of	Moldova,	the	rise	to	power	of	a	pro-
European	coalition	in	2009.	 In	the	other	countries	the	situation	
worsened	during	the	same	period,	most	notably	in	Armenia	after	
2008	(as	a	result	of	the	deep	political	crisis	after	the	2008	general	
election,	 among	 other	 factors20)	 and	 in	 Ukraine	 (which	 experi-
enced	a	relapse	after	the	success	of	the	2004	Orange	Revolution).	
20	 For	more	information	see	International	Crisis	Group,	Armenia:	Picking	up	
the	 Pieces,	 2008,	 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b48_
armenia_picking_up_the_pieces.pdf
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Figure 2.	Democracy	and	market	economy	(Bertelsmann	Trans-
formation	Index)
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Belarus,	which	does	not	have	well-developed	relations	with	 the	
EU	and	is	the	EaP	country	with	which	the	EU	is	least	involved,	has	
performed	best	in	terms	of	the	human	development	index	of	the	
United	Nations	 Development	 Programme	 (UNDP),	 and	 in	 rank-
ings	of	economic	development	measured	by	GDP	per capita	based	
on	purchasing	power	parity.	
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country
human development Index
 (0.000 worst score – 1.000 best score)
/ position in ranking
year 2005 2010 2011 2012
armenia 0.775	/	83 0.695	/	76 0.716	/	86 0.729	/	87
azerbaijan 0.746	/	98 0.713	/	67 0.700	/	91 0.734	/	82
belarus 0.804	/	64 0.732	/	61 0.756	/	65 0.793	/	50
georgia 0.754	/	96 0.698	/	74 0.733	/	75 0.745	/	72
Moldova 0.708	/	111 0.623	/	99 0.649	/	111 0.660	/	113
ukraine 0.788	/	76 0.710	/	69 0.729	/	76 0.740	/	78
Source:	UNDP,	http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
Azerbaijan	has	markedly	reduced	the	gap	separating	its	economy	
from	the	EU,	but	 this	has	happened	 irrespective	of	EU	support,	
primarily	thanks	to	the	country’s	natural	resource	wealth	and	its	
revenues	from	exports	to	the	European	Union.
Figure 3.	GDP	PPP	of	EaP	countries	as	%	of	EU	GDP	PPP
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Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	IMF	data,	www.imf.org
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On	the	other	hand,	the	countries	most	committed	to	rapproche-
ment	with	the	Union,	principally	Moldova	but	also	Ukraine,	have	
reported	 little	 improvement	 of	 their	 development	 indexes.	 The	
same	 applies	 to	 performance	with	 regard	 to	 economic	 freedom	
and	the	ease	of	doing	business,	with	Moldova	and	Ukraine	being	
the	worst	performers.
country
Index of economic freedom
 (heritage foundation & Wall Street Journal)
 (0 worst score – 100 best score)/position in ranking
year 2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013
armenia 70.3	/	23 68.6	/	34 69.8	/	31 69.7	/	36 68.8	/	39 69.4	/	38
azerbaijan 53.4	/	116 54.6	/	111 57.9	/	97 59.7	/	91 58.9	/	91 59.7	/	87
belarus 43.1	/	146 47.0	/	144 44.9	/	167 47.9	/	155 49.0	/	153 48.0	/	153
georgia 58.9	/	78 69.3	/	30 69.7	/	32 70.4	/	28 69.4	/	34 72.2	/	21
Moldova 57.1	/	93 58.7	/	83 54.8	/	120 55.7	/	120 54.4	/	124 55.5	/	115
ukraine 53.7	/	114 51.5	/	134 48.8	/	152 45.8	/	163 46.1	/	163 46.3	/	161
Source:	Heritage	Foundation	and	Wall Street Journal,	http://www.heritage.
org/index/
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Figure 4.	Doing	Business
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rankings
One	of	the	priorities	of	co-operation	under	the	ENP	is	to	combat	cor-
ruption.	However,	with	the	exception	of	Georgia,	and	to	a	lesser	ex-
tent	Moldova,	none	of	the	EaP	countries	have	reported	any	marked	
improvement	in	this	respect	compared	to	the	situation	in	2004.	
Figure 5.	Corruption	Perceptions	Index	(Transparency	International)
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3. Economic integration with the EU
The	EU’s	efforts	to	develop	relations	with	the	eastern	neighbour-
hood	have	not	resulted	in	closer	economic	integration	either.	De-
spite	 the	measures	 taken	to	remove	barriers	 to	 trade	exchange,	
and	the	overall	increase	in	the	volume	of	trade,	the	Union’s	share	
in	 the	 EaP	 countries’	 trade	 did	 not	 change	 significantly	 in	 the	
years	2004–2011.	Moldova	is	an	exception	here:	the	Union’s	share	
in	its	trade	increased	by	11	percent	in	the	period	in	question	(from	
43%	to	54%	for	Moldova’s	total	trade	turnover).	Interestingly,	the	
EU’s	 shares	 in	 the	 trade	of	Ukraine	and	Georgia,	 the	 two	coun-
tries	which	along	with	Moldova	have	made	the	greatest	progress	
in	political	rapprochement	and	free-trade	area	negotiations	with	
the	Union,	are	smaller	than	its	shares	in	the	trade	of	the	other	EaP	
countries.
Figure 6.	EU	share	in	trade	of	EaP	countries
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Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	IMF	data
The	dynamics	of	trade	exchange	have	mainly	been	influenced	by	
the	economic	developments	in	the	European	Union	and	the	situ-
ation	on	global	markets.	The	Union’s	first	financial	crisis	in	2009	
led	to	a	noticeable	decrease	in	trade	with	the	Eastern	Partnership	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
13
27
countries,	and	it	was	only	in	2011	that	the	volume	of	trade	started	
to	return	to	the	2008	levels.	This	shows	that	the	economic	situa-
tion	in	the	EU	and	in	the	neighbour	countries	has	a	much	greater	
impact	on	the	intensity	of	economic	co-operation	than	the	meas-
ures	taken	as	part	of	the	ENP.
Figure 7.	Total	EaP	exports	to	and	imports	from	EU
[US$ bn]
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Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	IMF	data,	www.imf.org
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III. ThE ParTNErS’ PErcEPTIONS Of WhaT  
ThE Eu haS TO OffEr
The	European	Union	is	not	the	only	party	to	experience	a	sense	
of	unfulfilled	expectations	with	regard	to	relations	between	itself	
and	the	EaP	countries.	The	partner	countries	also	are	increasing-
ly	disillusioned	with	EU	policy,	because	what	the	Union	has	to	of-
fer	does	not	match	their	expectations.	Despite	declarations	about	
“co-ownership”	of	the	EaP	initiative	and	the	fact	that	actions	un-
der	the	ENP	should	be	jointly	agreed	by	the	Union	and	the	part-
ner	 countries,	 the	 ENP	 and	 the	 EaP	 are	 primarily	 instruments	
of	EU	policy	designed	 to	 serve	 the	pursuit	of	 the	EU’s	 interests.	
Within	this	framework,	the	Union	has	proposed	a	certain	model	
of	relations	to	which	the	partner	countries	are	expected	to	adapt,	
without	in	fact	having	any	influence	on	its	shape.	The	partners	do	
not	perceive	European	integration	as	their	own	project.	Neither	
do	the	elites	of	EaP	countries	consider	integration	to	be	the	only	
path	of	development	available	to	them.	The	partner	countries’	at-
titudes	towards	the	EU	and	the	level	of	their	commitment	to	re-
lations	with	 the	Union	depend	on	the	current	political	and	eco-
nomic	situation	and	the	short-term	interests	of	the	ruling	elites.	
1. European integration and the partners’ interests
The	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	the	Eastern	Partnership	
employ	 the	mechanisms	of	 the	EU	enlargement	policy,	 including	
the	adoption	of	the	EU’s	extensive	acquis by	the	partners,	in	return	
for	financial	and	technical	support	or	other	benefits	such	as	trade	
preferences	or	access	 to	EU	programmes	and	agencies.	However,	
not	all	EaP	countries	are	interested	in	rapprochement	with	the	Un-
ion	on	such	terms.	For	Belarus	or	Azerbaijan,	the	priority	objectives	
include	economic	and	trade	co-operation,	technology	transfer	and	
easier	access	 to	 the	European	market	 (with	continued	protection	
for	their	own	markets).	The	leadership	in	both	countries	opposes	
political	and	economic	liberalisation,	which	is	perceived	as	a	threat	
to	the	ruling	elites’	position	on	the	internal	political	scene.	Belarus	
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is	furthermore	involved	in	economic	and	political	integration	with	
Russia	within	the	framework	of	the	Customs	Union.	For	Azerbai-
jan,	on	the	other	hand,	the	priority	objective	is	to	sell	oil	to	the	EU	
markets	(oil	accounts	for	99.5%	of	Azerbaijan’s	exports	to	the	EU21).	
Thanks	to	its	oil	export	revenues,	Baku	does	not	depend	on	EU	fi-
nancial	 assistance,	while	 the	Union	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 dependent	
on	co-operation	with	Azerbaijan,	as	it	is	one	of	the	most	important	
suppliers	of	oil	to	the	EU	markets,	accounting	for	4.7%	of	EU’s	oil	
imports	in	201122.
In	those	countries	for	which	integration	with	the	EU	is	a	declared	
priority	 (Georgia,	 Moldova,	 Ukraine,	 Armenia),	 the	 problem	 is	
that	integration	does	not	offer	sufficient	benefits	which	could	off-
set	its	high	financial	and	social	costs.	The	absence	of	membership	
prospects	undermines	 the	sensibility	of	adopting	EU	 legislation	
and	 standards,	 as	 the	partner	 countries	have	no	 say	 in	 the	 for-
mulation	of	EU	laws	and	solutions,	and	have	no	way	to	realise	the	
benefits	that	these	offer.	
Because	of	the	financial	crisis	 in	the	eurozone,	the	eastern	part-
ners	have	ceased	to	regard	the	EU	economic	model	as	the	optimal	
way	to	achieve	prosperity	for	their	countries.	This	is	all	the	more	
important	as	integration	with	the	European	Union	is	not	the	only	
option	available	to	the	eastern	neighbours.	An	alternative	is	pro-
vided	by	the	integration	projects	initiated	by	Russia,	namely	the	
Customs	Union	which	is	expected	to	transform	into	the	Eurasian	
Union	in	2015.	The	two	projects,	 integration	with	the	EU	and	in-
tegration	under	the	aegis	of	Russia,	are	mutually	exclusive.	This	
is	 leading	 to	 growing	 rivalry	 between	 them,	 and	 is	 forcing	 the	
EaP	countries	to	choose	their	 integration	models	and	directions.	
Still,	 for	 those	countries	 in	 the	 shared	neighbourhood	of	 the	EU	
21	 2011	figures	from	the	European	Commission’s	Directorate	General	for	Trade:	
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113347.pdf
22	 European	Commission,	Directorate	General	for	Energy,	Registration	of	Crude	Oil	
Imports	and	Deliveries	in	the	European	Union	(EU27),	Market	Observatory	for	
Energy,	http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm	
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and	 Russia	 which	 have	 strong	 economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	
ties	with	both	sides,	it	is	important	to	maintain	as	good	relations	
as	possible	with	both	big	neighbours.	This	is	why	all	the	partner	
countries	(with	the	sole	exception	of	Georgia)	have	been	trying	to	
pursue	a	policy	of	balancing	between	the	EU	and	Russia	and	gain-
ing	benefits	from	both	sides	(including	financial	assistance,	trade	
preferences,	 economic	 subsidies,	 political	 support,	 etc.).	 At	 the	
same	time,	because	of	their	heavy	economic	and	political	depend-
ence	 on	 Russia,	 the	 EU’s	 eastern	 neighbours	 have	 been	wary	 of	
any	significant	deterioration	in	their	relations	with	Russia,	which	
rapprochement	with	Europe	could	cause.	Meanwhile,	Russia	sees	
the	region	as	its	own	sphere	of	influence,	and	has	been	trying	to	
counteract	 its	 closer	 integration	with	 the	EU	 structures.	 For	 in-
stance,	the	Russian	government	has	already	threatened	to	restrict	
Ukraine’s	 access	 to	 the	 Russian	market	 if	 the	 country	 signs	 the	
free	 trade	agreement	with	 the	Union23.	 In	another	 telling	exam-
ple,	Moldova	had	to	postpone	the	deadline	for	complying	with	its	
obligations	under	the	Energy	Community24	under	pressure	from	
Russia25.	Without	measurable	economic	compensation	and	politi-
cal	support	from	the	Union,	the	partner	countries	will	not	risk	any	
deterioration	in	their	relations	with	Russia.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
23	 For	example,	during	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	summit	in	Mos-
cow	on	19	March	2012,	the	Russian	president	Dmitri	Medvedev	said:	“We	
have	 talked	 about	 the	 benefits,	 and	 also	 about	 the	 difficulties,	 that	may	
arise	and	are	already	arising	in	the	countries	which	are	not	members	of	
the	 Customs	Union.	 This	 is	 life;	 if	 you	 are	 a	member	 of	 an	 internation-
al	 structure,	you	get	specific	privileges.	 If	you	opt	out,	you	can	run	 into	
trouble.”	 Quoted	 in	 Vladimir	 Solovyov,	 Sergei	 Sidorenko,	 Bezotkaznaya	
strategia,	Kommersant Ukraina,	Issue	45	(1535),	20	March	2012,	http://kom-
mersant.ua/doc/1896790
24	 The	commitments	concern	the	liberalisation	of	a	country’s	energy	market	
and	its	integration	with	the	European	Union	under	EU	legislation	(includ-
ing	the	implementation	of	the	Third	Energy	Package).
25	 Witold	Rodkiewicz,	Moldova	signals	that	it	may	withdraw	from	implement-
ing	the	Third	Energy	Package,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	11	July	
2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-07-11/moldo-
va-signals-it-may-withdraw-implementing-third-energy-package
	 Energy	Community,	10th	Energy	Community	Ministerial	Council,	Meeting	
Conclusions,	Budva,	 18	October	2012,	http://www.energy-community.org/
pls/portal/docs/1766216.PDF
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eastern	neighbours	do	see	dialogue	and	rapprochement	with	the	
Union	as	a	way	to	counterbalance	the	asymmetry	in	their	relations	
with	Russia.	The	EaP	countries	are	afraid	of	a	breakdown	of	the	
process	of	European	integration,	because	that	would	considerably	
undermine	their	positions	vis-à-vis	Moscow.	Belarus	is	a	case	in	
point,	as	the	country’s	dependence	on	Russia	increased	after	its	re-
lationship	with	Brussels	broke	down	in	December	2010,	after	the	
Belarusian	regime	stepped	up	repression	against	the	public.	
The	political	weakness	shown	by	the	Union	in	its	efforts	to	man-
age	the	regional	conflicts	 in	Eastern	Europe	has	diminished	the	
importance	of	European	integration	on	the	partner	countries’	po-
litical	agendas.	This	applies	for	instance	to	Azerbaijan	and	Arme-
nia,	 for	whom	their	 conflict	over	 the	Nagorno-Karabakh	region	
is	a	key	issue.	Because	the	EU	presence	in	and	impact	on	the	Na-
gorno-Karabakh	conflict	is	limited,	it	is	not	perceived	as	an	influ-
ential	political	player.	Nor	do	 the	EaP	countries	view	the	Union	
as	an	actor	that	could	support	them	in	the	pursuit	of	their	most	
important	foreign	policy	objectives;	as	a	result,	they	are	less	inter-
ested	in	real	rapprochement	with	the	Union.	This	is	what	sets	the	
situation	in	the	Eastern	Partnership	apart	from	earlier	develop-
ments	in	the	Western	Balkans,	where	the	Union	played	a	decisive	
role	in	the	resolution	of	regional	conflicts,	which	also	boosted	the	
Western	Balkan	 countries’	 commitment	 to	 the	process	 of	Euro-
pean	integration26.
2. Bureaucrats’ offers vs. politicians’ interests
The	 attitudes	 of	 the	 local	 political	 elites	 are	 crucial	 if	 any	 pro-
gress	is	to	be	made	in	developing	closer	relations	with	the	EU.	Po-
litical	leaders	in	the	partner	countries	often	use	rapprochement	
with	the	Union	instrumentally	as	a	means	to	achieve	short-term	
26	 Jan	Muś,	Rafał	Sadowski	(ed.),	Bałkany	Zachodnie	i	integracja	europejska:	
perspektywy	 i	 implikacje,	Office	of	 the	Committee	 for	European	 Integra-
tion,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	Warsaw	2008.
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political	and	economic	gains.	Their	aims	in	relations	with	the	EU	
include	in	particular:	(1)	using	EU	support	to	achieve	their	foreign	
policy	objectives,	 (2)	obtaining	financial	support	 for	 their	coun-
tries,	in	which	they	are	guided	by	mercantilist	attitudes,	(3)	us-
ing	contacts	with	the	EU	to	boost	their	own	political	positions,	(4)	
improving	their	own	image	internationally,	(5)	legitimising	their	
regimes,	in	the	cases	of	the	undemocratic	states.	
Because	of	 the	discrepancy	between	 the	 stated	objectives	 of	 in-
tegration	and	 the	 timeframes	 in	which	 they	are	 supposed	 to	be	
achieved	(a	dozen	years	or	more)	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	cur-
rent	 interests	of	politicians	 in	 the	partner	countries	 (with	 time	
horizons	of	one	or	two	years)	on	the	other,	 the	ultimate	success	
of	integration	is	of	no	importance	for	the	latter.	The	political	and	
financial	costs	of	 implementing	reforms	have	also	been	denting	
the	 political	 will	 to	 achieve	 real	 progress.	 Any	 stimulus	 to	 re-
form	comes	not	from	the	idea	of	rapprochement	with	the	Union,	
but	 from	 those	 current	 economic	 and	 social	 challenges	 which	
are	likely	to	undermine	the	position	of	the	political	elite.	It	is	the	
threat	of	economic	crises,	which	could	lead	to	social	protests,	and	
not	a	general	vision	of	building	prosperity	hand	in	hand	with	the	
Union,	that	forces	the	leaders	to	undertake	reforms.	In	such	cas-
es,	 the	partner	 states	often	consider	co-operation	with	 interna-
tional	financial	 institutions	such	as	the	International	Monetary	
Fund,	which	is	capable	of	quickly	providing	concrete	advice	and	
financial	assistance,	to	be	more	effective	than	co-operation	with	
the	Union.	 Ukraine’s	 co-operation	with	 the	 IMF	 after	 the	 2009	
crisis	 is	a	 case	 in	point:	 some	reforms	were	 implemented	 in	re-
turn	for	financial	assistance,	 including	the	adoption	of	a	 law	on	
pensions,	partial	reform	of	the	gas	market,	changes	in	the	fiscal	
and	budget	policies,	and	banking	sector	restructuring27.	Belarus	
is	another	example:	after	 the	2009	economic	crisis,	 the	country	
27	 See:	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 From	 stabilisation	 to	 stagna-
tion.	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	reforms,	Point	of	View,	Centre	for	Eastern	Stud-
ies,	 Warsaw,	 2013,	 p.	 21–22,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/
PW_32_ANG_net.pdf	
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implemented	some	limited	changes	in	co-operation	with	the	IMF	
(which	granted	it	a	loan	of	US$3.5	billion),	as	a	result	of	which	the	
country	considerably	improved	its	score	in	the	World	Bank’s	Do-
ing	Business	ranking.	
The	public	in	the	EaP	countries	exerts	very	little	pressure	on	the	
leaders	 to	 pursue	 closer	 integration	 with	 the	 European	 Union.	
With	the	exception	of	Moldova	and	Georgia,	this	issue	has	had	no	
impact	on	the	governments’	approval	ratings,	nor	is	it	decisive	for	
success	at	the	ballot	box.	From	the	public’s	point	of	view,	the	ENP	
process	is	incomprehensible,	and	its	effects	barely	visible.	For	or-
dinary	people,	the	key	issue	is	visa	liberalisation,	which,	howev-
er,	is	a	long-term	process.	
The	oligarchic	nature	of	the	eastern	neighbours’	political	systems	
and	the	close	ties	between	the	political	and	business	elites	(to	dif-
ferent	degrees	and	in	different	forms,	depending	on	the	country)	
are	also	important	factors	in	this	context.	These	have	two	kinds	of	
serious	consequences	for	the	prospects	of	integration	with	Europe.
Firstly,	 the	 political	 elites	 are	 interested	 mainly	 in	 defending	
their	own	positions	within	the	existing	system	of	power,	which	
ensures	business	influence	for	them.	As	a	result,	they	seek	to	keep	
the	existing	 systems	 intact	 and	are	 reluctant	 to	 implement	any	
deeper	reforms.	This	approach	runs	counter	to	the	assumptions	
of	EU	policy,	at	the	core	of	which	there	are	political	and	economic	
liberalisation	and	transparency	of	the	systems	of	power.	The	most	
extreme	examples	come	from	the	authoritarian	regimes	in	Bela-
rus	and	Azerbaijan,	but	similar	phenomena	can	also	be	observed	
in	 the	 other	 countries,	 where	 power	 and	 business	 assets	 have	
been	divided	up	among	a	closed	political	class.	
The	 second	 consequence	 of	 this	 character	 of	 the	 political	 sys-
tems	concerns	the	considerable	influence	that	oligarchic	business	
groups	have	on	government	decisions.	The	actions	of	those	groups	
are	guided	by	calculations	of	self-interest,	which	may	be	focused	
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on	 maintaining	 dominant	 positions	 in	 certain	 sectors	 of	 the	
economy,	business	benefits,	etc.	For	this	reason,	introducing	free	
competition	or	opening	internal	markets	–	steps	envisaged	by	the	
free-trade	agreement	with	Ukraine,	for	instance	–	may	be	damag-
ing	to	the	oligarchs.	On	the	other	hand,	the	agreement	also	creates	
new	opportunities	 for	 them,	 including	 access	 to	 the	EU	market	
(which	 is	 crucial	 to	 entrepreneurs	operating	 in	export	 sectors).	
Consequently,	the	business	elites	do	not	take	consistent	attitudes	
towards	the	process	of	European	integration	or	the	reforms.	Any	
progress	in	this	respect	will	depend	on	internal	conditions:	some	
actions	will	be	blocked,	while	others	may	be	implemented.	
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Iv. dIffErENcES WIThIN ThE Eu
Apart	from	the	obvious	differences	between	the	individual	part-
ner	countries’	relations	with	the	European	Union,	there	are	also	
differences	 within	 the	 Union,	 as	 its	 members	 have	 not	 taken	
a	uniform	position	on	 the	eastern	policy.	Those	differences	be-
tween	 the	 various	 players	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 institutions	 and	 the	
member	states,	have	come	to	the	foreground	as	a	result	of	mount-
ing	 internal	 problems,	 including	 the	 dispute	 over	 the	 future	
shape	of	the	EU,	the	financial	crisis	and	instability	in	the	south-
ern	neighbourhood.	While	there	is	consensus	on	the	general	ob-
jectives	 of	 the	 neighbourhood	 policy,	 positions	 on	 the	 detailed	
issues	 differ	 according	 to	 the	 individual	 actors’	 interests	 and	
political	aims.	Currently,	three	issues	are	key:	(1)	the	signature	
of	 the	 Association	 Agreements	 and	 the	 Deep	 And	 Comprehen-
sive	Free	Trade	Agreements	(DCFTAs),	especially	with	Ukraine;	
(2)	visa	 liberalisation	and	the	shape	of	migration	policy;	(3)	 the	
scale	 of	 EU	 involvement	 in	 the	 eastern	 neighbourhood.	 At	 the	
core	of	the	differences	of	positions	on	these	issues	are	different	
perceptions	 of	 the	 ultimate	 objective	 of	 European	 integration,	
and	 the	 related	 question	 about	 attitudes	 towards	 granting	 the	
partner	states	prospects	of	membership.
In	view	of	 the	existing	differences,	 the	EU’s	policy	 is	a	compro-
mise	based	on	the	lowest	common	denominator.	As	the	long-term	
strategic	objective	of	 the	neighbourhood	policy	 (membership	 in	
the	Union,	 or	 a	 different	 form	 of	 integration)	 is	 not	 clearly	 de-
fined,	and	as	the	eastern	neighbourhood	is	of	little	importance	for	
the	majority	of	the	EU	members,	the	EU	institutions	have	mainly	
been	taking	ad hoc	actions.	Consequently,	their	efforts	are	not	fo-
cused	on	reaching	specific	 long-term	political	objectives,	but	on	
fulfilling	successive	bureaucratic	procedures	(such	as	negotiating	
successive	articles	of	the	Association	Agreements	or	visa	liberali-
sation	agreements,	etc.),	which	erodes	the	political	significance	of	
the	Eastern	Partnership.
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1. Attitude towards the Association Agreement with Ukraine
With	regard	to	the	Association	Agreements	and	the	DCFTAs,	the	
differences	in	the	individual	EU	members’	attitudes	are	due	to	the	
fact	 that	some	of	 them	treat	signature	as	an	 instrument	of	con-
ditionality,	while	others	see	it	as	an	instrument	to	stimulate	re-
forms	and	durably	bind	the	partners	with	the	EU.	In	the	former	
case,	the	Agreements	are	viewed	as	a	kind	of	‘stick	and	carrot’;	the	
benefits	they	offer	are	seen	as	a	reward	for	progress	in	transfor-
mation,	and	refusal	to	sign	as	a	punishment	for	failure	to	deliver	
on	commitments.	In	the	latter	case,	the	Agreements	are	treated	as	
a	mechanism	serving	the	purposes	of	modernisation	and	integra-
tion	with	the	EU	more	effectively	than	the	mechanisms	originally	
provided	for	in	the	ENP	(for	instance,	they	lay	down	specific	ob-
ligations	and	detailed	schedules	for	the	implementation	of	a	sub-
stantial	portion	of	the	EU’s	acquis).	
Those	 differences	 have	 become	 most	 prominent	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Ukraine,	 and	 the	 EU’s	 decision	 to	 suspend	 the	 signature	 of	 the	
Association	Agreement	and	 the	DCFTA	 initialled	 in	201228	 in	 re-
sponse	to	the	2011	imprisonment	of	opposition	leaders,	including	
the	former	PM	Yulia	Tymoshenko	and	the	Interior	Minister	Yuri	
Lutsenko.	In	response,	in	2012	the	EU	formulated	three	conditions	
that	Ukraine	would	have	to	fulfil	in	order	for	the	suspension	to	be	
revoked;	these	concerned	stopping	repression,	conducting	demo-
cratic	elections,	and	achieving	progress	in	reforms29.	However,	the	
political	pressure	from	the	EU	failed	to	persuade	Kyiv	to	meet	the	
conditions.	In	this	situation	some	member	states	and	civil	society	
28	 Initialled	in	two	steps	on	30	March	and	18	July.
29	 Štefan	 Füle,	 Speech	 at	 the	meeting	 of	 the	EU-Ukraine	Parliamentary	Co-
operation	 Committee,	 14	 July	 2012,	 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-12-448_en.htm?locale=en
	 The	conditions	were	restated	in	the	EU	council	conclusions	of	10	December	
2012,	see:	Council	of	the	EU, Council	conclusions	on	Ukraine,	3209th	Foreign	
Affairs	Council	meeting,	Brussels,	10.12.2012,	http://www.consilium.euro-
pa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf
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organisations	 argued	 that	 the	 agreements	 should	not	 be	 signed,	
pointing	in	the	first	place	to	the	need	to	stand	up	for	human	rights,	
which	is	regarded	as	a	cornerstone	of	EU	policies.	From	this	point	
of	view,	 it	 important	 for	 the	EU	to	save	 face	and	respond	appro-
priately	to	the	fact	that	Kyiv	had	ignored	its	calls	to	respect	demo-
cratic	 standards.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	advocates	of	 signature,	
including	 some	 member	 states	 and	 business	 circles	 in	 the	 EU,	
pragmatically	highlighted	the	need	to	defend	economic	 interests	
(by	safeguarding	the	interests	of	companies	doing	business	on	the	
Ukrainian	market)	and	political	objectives	(it	was	argued	that	the	
agreement	was	an	 instrument	 for	building	closer	 relations	with	
the	EU,	and	could	prevent	rapprochement	with	Russia).	Speedy	im-
plementation	of	the	obligations	under	the	Association	Agreement	
/	DCFTA	was	also	expected	to	stimulate	reforms.	Failure	 to	sign	
the	Agreement,	on	the	other	hand,	was	said	to	be	likely	to	bring	
negative	consequences	 for	 the	 future	of	relations	with	 the	other	
countries	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood,	and	to	erode	the	political	
significance	of	the	agreements	and	the	political	will	to	sign	them.	
It	was	only	in	the	spring	of	2013	that	the	Ukrainian	government	grad-
ually	started	to	take	action	to	meet	the	EU’s	conditions.	On	12	March	
the	 Ukrainian	 president	 issued	 a	 decree	 on	 European	 integration	
(obliging	state	institutions	to	take	faster	action	to	implement	the	nec-
essary	legislative	changes,	carry	out	reforms	and	co-operate	with	EU	
institutions),	and	on	7	April,	Yuri	Lutsenko	was	pardoned.	However,	
those	steps	can	reasonably	be	regarded	as	incomplete,	and	largely	in-
tended	as	image-improving	measures.	The	decree	on	European	inte-
gration	contains	only	very	general	provisions,	whereas	what	the	EU	
expects	is	tangible	progress.	As	regards	Lutsenko,	he	was	released	
from	jail	after	serving	half	his	sentence,	but	his	conviction	was	not	
legally	overturned,	which	means	that	he	will	not	be	able	to	run	in	
any	elections	before	the	conviction	record	is	expunged	in	202130.
30	 Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Ukraine:	Yuri	Lutsenko	pardoned’,	Eastweek,	Centre	
for	Eastern	Studies,	 10	April	 2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
eastweek/2013-04-10/ukraine-yuri-lutsenko-pardoned	
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2. Attitudes towards visa liberalisation
Another	 contentious	 issue	 concerns	 the	 prospect	 of	 abolishing	
the	visa	regime	for	the	eastern	neighbours.	This	is	an	important	
question	because	visa	liberalisation	is	what	mainly	interests	the	
leaderships	and	people	of	the	partner	countries.	In	the	context	of	
a	mounting	crisis	 in	the	EU’s	migration	policy,	as	well	as	the	fi-
nancial	crisis,	many	EU	countries	are	unwilling	to	proceed	with	
visa	liberalisation.	Internal	political	conditions	and	the	aversion	
of	some	European	societies	to	easing	the	visa	regimes	and	offer-
ing	 immigrants	 more	 access	 to	 labour	 markets	 are	 important	
factors	here31.	The	advocates	of	quick	liberalisation,	on	the	other	
hand,	believe	that	visa-free	travel	would	create	opportunities	for	
the	development	of	human	contacts,	and	see	it	as	an	instrument	
to	 stimulate	 bottom-up	 transformations	 through	 co-operation	
at	 the	 level	 of	 civic	 society.	Migration	 from	 the	 culturally	 close	
countries	of	Eastern	Europe	is	also	regarded	as	a	potential	instru-
ment	in	solving	the	demographic	problems	experienced	by	the	EU	
countries.	Finally,	the	economic	aspects	–	namely	economic	gains	
for	 the	 EU	 countries,	 promotion	 of	 border-area	 trade,	 develop-
ment	of	tourism	in	the	EU	countries	and	the	development	of	busi-
ness	co-operation	–	are	also	important32.	The	division	between	the	
advocates	and	opponents	of	visa	liberalisation	runs	partly	along	
country	lines.	The	member	states	in	favour	include	the	Visegrad	
Group,	 the	 Baltic	 States	 and	 Romania,	 while	 Germany,	 France,	
Austria	 and	 the	Netherlands	 are	 against	 it.	However,	 there	 are	
31	 For	example,	according	to	a	Transatlantic	Trends	survey	from	2011,	52%	of	
Europeans	regarded	immigration	as	a	problem,	rather	than	an	opportuni-
ty.	Transatlantic	Trends:	Immigration,	The	German	Marshall	Fund	of	the	
United	States,	2012,	http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2011/12/TTImmigration_
final_web1.pdf
32	 For	more	information	on	the	prospects	of	visa-free	travel	between	the	EU	
and	 its	 eastern	 neighbours	 see	Marta	 Jaroszewicz,	 ‘Making	 the	 impossi-
ble	possible.	The	prospects	for	visa-free	movement	between	the	EU	and	its	
eastern	partners’,	Point	of	View,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	Warsaw,	2012,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2012-06-06/making-
impossible-possible-prospects-visafree-movement-between-e
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also	divisions	within	countries;	while	business	communities,	civ-
il	society	organisations	and	diplomats	generally	advocate	liberali-
sation,	institutions	in	charge	of	security	(such	as	interior	minis-
tries	and	migration	services)	tend	to	oppose	it.	In	some	countries,	
significant	sections	of	the	public	are	also	against	easing	the	visa	
regime,	which	affects	political	parties’	stances	on	the	issue.
3. The Eastern neighbourhood on the EU’s political agenda
Different	actors	in	the	Union	also	have	different	views	of	the	role	
of	the	eastern	neighbourhood	in	EU	policy.	Given	the	EU’s	multiple	
priorities	and	limited	potential,	 the	position	occupied	by	a	given	
region	 in	 the	 EU’s	 political	 agenda	 is	 inevitably	 reflected	 in	 the	
scale	of	the	Union’s	real	political	and	financial	involvement	there.	
On	the	scale	of	the	EU’s	global	interests,	the	EaP	countries	are	of	
secondary	importance	because	of	their	limited	economic	and	polit-
ical	potential.	In	the	Union’s	trade	policy,	relations	with	the	United	
States	 and	 other	 strategic	 partners	 such	 as	 India,	 China,	 Japan,	
Canada	and	Russia	are	crucial.	 It	 is	 those	directions	 that	attract	
the	attention	and	involvement	of	EU	officials	in	the	first	place.
However,	even	as	far	as	the	Union’s	immediate	neighbourhood	is	
concerned,	many	EU	countries	have	been	attaching	greater	 sig-
nificance	to	the	development	of	relations	with	the	Union’s	south-
ern	 neighbours.	 The	 rivalry	 between	 the	 EU	members	 focused	
on	the	eastern	neighbourhood,	and	those	for	whom	the	southern	
neighbourhood	is	more	important,	is	as	old	as	the	ENP	itself33.	The	
debate	between	the	two	camps	resumed	in	early	2011	with	the	out-
break	of	revolutions	in	North	Africa	and	the	negotiations	of	the	
new	multi-annual	financial	framework	for	the	years	2014–2020.	
The	exchange	 triggered	by	a	 letter	and	a	non-paper	released	by	
six	southern	EU	members	in	February	2011,	in	which	they	called	
33	 Iván	Martín,	New	context	of	the	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	and	the	East-
ern	 Partnership,	 EaPCommunity,	 2011,	 http://www.easternpartnership.
org/community/interview/new-context-union-mediterranean-and-east-
ern-partnership.
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for	 funds	 to	 be	 transferred	 from	 the	 eastern	 neighbourhood	 to	
the	southern	dimension,	is	a	case	in	point34.	Event	though	in	suc-
cessive	 documents	 the	 European	 Commission	 tried	 to	 present	
a	picture	of	balanced	involvement	in	both	areas,	the	changes	im-
plemented	as	a	result	of	the	ENP	review	and	the	actions	actually	
being	 taken	 show	 that	 the	dynamics	of	 the	Union’s	political	 in-
volvement	is	stronger	towards	the	south	than	in	the	east35.	This	
tendency	will	continue	because	of	the	civil	war	in	Syria,	instabil-
ity	in	Egypt	and	Libya,	and	the	marked	rise	in	terror	threats	and	
al-Qaeda-related	activities	in	North	Africa,	which	has	already	led	
to	the	French	military	intervention	and	the	deployment	of	an	EU	
training	mission	in	Mali	in	early	2013.
34	 Szymon	Ananicz,	Tug-of-war	over	EU’s	policy	towards	its	neighbours,	OSW	
Commentary,	 Centre	 for	 Eastern	 Studies,	 9	 March	 2011,	 http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-03-09/tug-war-over-eu-s-
policy-towards-its-neighbours
35	 Rafał	Sadowski,	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	Package	–	Conclusions	for	
the	Eastern	Partners,	OSW Commentary,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	25	May	
2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/
european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn.
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v. challENgES fOr Eu POlIcY
In	the	current	political	and	economic	situation	in	Europe,	three	
processes	will	have	the	greatest	impact	on	the	future	of	the	Un-
ion’s	 relations	 with	 its	 eastern	 partners:	 (1)	 economic	 develop-
ments	in	the	EU	member	countries	and	in	Eastern	Europe	in	the	
context	of	the	EU’s	financial	crisis	and	economic	slowdown	in	the	
EaP	countries;	(2)	possible	changes	to	the	Union’s	decision-making	
processes	and	institutional	make-up;	(3)	Russia’s	policy	towards	
the	region.
1. Economic slowdown
The	current	economic	conditions	are	hardly	conducive	to	develop-
ing	closer	co-operation	with	the	eastern	neighbours	in	the	imme-
diate	future.	Figures	for	2012	and	forecasts	for	2013	show	that	the	
partner	countries’	economies	have	become	increasingly	unstable.	
Over	 the	 last	 two	years,	 the	EaP	 countries	have	been	gradually	
making	up	for	 the	 losses	 incurred	as	a	result	of	 the	2009	crisis,	
but	 the	new	wave	of	 the	financial	 crisis	 in	Europe	has	 subdued	
growth.	Slower	economic	growth	has	been	reported	everywhere	
except	Armenia	 and	Georgia36.	Moreover,	 all	 the	 partner	 coun-
tries	apart	from	Azerbaijan	and	Belarus	have	seen	their	foreign	
trade	 deficits	 rise37,	 and	 all	 have	 been	 experiencing	 mounting	
budgetary	problems.
36	 Even	in	Georgia,	whose	GDP	grew	7.5%	in	2012,	growth	in	the	last	quarter	of	
2012	was	markedly	slower,	at	2.3%	according	to	preliminary	data.
37	 Azerbaijan	owes	its	trade	surplus	to	revenues	from	oil	exports,	and	in	Bela-
rus	 the	 surplus	 is	 largely	generated	by	 the	export	 of	 oil	 and	petrochemi-
cal	products	manufactured	in	Belarusian	plants,	which	receive	energy	re-
sources	from	Russia	at	preferential	prices.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
7/
20
13
42
Macroeconomic data of the EaP countries for 2012 
gdP 
change 
in %
Infla-
tion 
in %
foreign trade 
balance in uS$bln 
/ as percentage of 
gdP 
Standard & 
Poor’s credit 
rating*
armenia 7.2% 2.6% -	2.55	/	26.3% no	data
azerbaijan 2.2% 1.1% +22.58	/	32.8% BBB-
belarus 1.5% 59.2%	 +0.2	/	0.3% B-	
georgia 7.5% -0.3% -5.47	/	36.2% BB-
Moldova -0.8% 4.6% -3.05	/	43,5% no	data
ukraine 0.2% -0.2% -13.78	/	8% B
*	As	of	23	April	2013.	Apart	from	Azerbaijan,	which	has	the	lowest	investment-
grade	rating,	the	remaining	countries	have	speculative-grade	ratings.
Source:	Official	figures	from	national	statistical	offices,	Standard	&	Poor’s,	
credit	ratings,	http://www.standardandpoors.com	(access	on	23.04.2013)
The	deteriorating	economic	situation	in	the	EU	will	lead	to	lower	
dynamics	of	trade	exchange	and	investment	(as	was	the	case	dur-
ing	the	2009	crisis),	and	will	make	EU	businesses	less	interested	
in	the	eastern	markets.	The	financial	sector	of	Ukraine,	the	only	
EaP	country	where	European	banks	had	made	major	investments,	
is	 a	 case	 in	point;	 in	2012	 several	 large	European	banks	 includ-
ing	Erste	Bank,	Commerzbank,	Swedbank,	Société	Générale,	SEB	
Group	and	Volksbank	 sold	 the	banks	 they	owned	 in	Ukraine	 to	
local	or	Russian	investors38.	
38	 Roman	Olearchyk,	Erste:	latest	EU	bank	to	dump	Ukraine,	beyondbrics	Finan-
cial Times,	20	December	2012,	http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/12/20/
erste-latest-eu-bank-to-dump-ukraine
	 Yelena	Gubar,	Ruslan	Chorniy,	Ukraina	meniayet	 investorov,	Kommersant 
Ukraina,	25	December	2012,	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/2097907
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This	decline	in	the	European	entrepreneurs’	 interest	 in	the	EaP	
markets	may	have	political	consequences	and	diminish	 the	 two	
sides’	political	will	to	sign	and	implement	the	Association	Agree-
ments	and	free-trade	agreements.	On	the	one	hand,	this	applies	to	
EU	businesses,	and	consequently	EU	member	states	and	institu-
tions	also.	However,	the	financial	crisis	and	economic	slowdown	
in	the	EU	will	also	make	the	partner	countries	less	interested	in	
economic	integration,	and	thus	less	willing	to	bear	the	related	fi-
nancial	and	political	costs.	The	above	example	of	Ukraine’s	bank-
ing	sector	shows	that	other	players,	including	Russian	investors	
in	particular,	may	take	advantage	of	the	disinvestment	of	Euro-
pean	capital.	
It	appears	that	the	economic	decline	in	European	markets	and	in	the	
partner	countries	may	have	short-	and	medium-term	consequences	
for	mutual	economic	relations.	If	the	situation	in	the	EU	improves,	
interest	in	developing	economic	co-operation	may	rise	again,	as	was	
the	case	after	the	2009	crisis,	 for	 instance,	when	investments	and	
trade	exchange	dynamics	grew	in	the	period	from	2010	to	2011.	
2. The future shape of the European Union
The	current	crisis	of	the	Union’s	decision-making	processes	and	
the	debate	on	the	EU’s	future	development,	the	prospective	scale	
of	political	and	economic	integration	(including	questions	about	
a	political	union),	the	potential	formation	of	a	multiple-speed	Eu-
rope	(as	a	result	of	the	Euro	zone	separating	itself	from	the	rest,	
among	 other	 factors),	 and	 finally	 the	 possible	 institutional	 re-
form,	will	all	affect	the	EU’s	relations	with	the	eastern	partners	
even	more	than	the	economic	crisis.	The	crucial	question	about	
the	long-term	objectives	of	relations	with	the	eastern	neighbours	
will	probably	remain	unanswered	until	the	Union	resolves	these	
fundamental	issues.	This	means	that	a	new	debate	on	a	thorough	
reform	of	the	EU’s	policy	towards	its	neighbours	will	not	be	pos-
sible	in	the	current	conditions,	and	the	ENP	and	the	EaP	will	re-
main	the	principal	instruments	of	EU	policy.	
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The	 separation	 of	 the	Euro	 zone	 and	 the	potential	 formation	 of	
a	multiple-speed	European	Union	will	have	very	 serious	 conse-
quences	for	the	Union’s	relations	with	its	eastern	neighbours,	and	
may	push	the	region	down	the	EU’s	political	agenda.	Most	of	the	
EU	member	 states	 interested	 in	 the	EaP	 region,	which	hitherto	
have	been	actively	stimulating	EU	activities	in	the	eastern	neigh-
bourhood,	will	 remain	 outside	 the	 Euro	 zone	 for	 a	 longer	 time	
(with	the	exceptions	of	Slovakia,	Estonia	and	eventually	Latvia),	
and	this	may	undermine	their	influence	on	the	direction	of	dis-
cussions	and	EU	policy.	If	the	divisions	within	the	Union	deepen,	
questions	about	possible	eastward	enlargement	and	the	eastern	
neighbourhood’s	integration	with	Europe	will	lose	relevance.	On	
the	other	hand,	if	the	EU	splits	into	several	circles	of	integration,	
it	might	be	theoretically	easier	for	the	EaP	countries	to	enter	the	
lowest	circle.	However,	that	would	bear	less	political	significance	
than	 full	membership	does	 today,	and	 the	benefits	 that	 the	EaP	
countries	 could	 reap	 from	membership	 would	 be	 limited.	 That	
in	 turn	would	make	European	 integration	 less	 attractive	 to	 the	
political	elites	and	publics	in	the	eastern	neighbours,	and	would	
thus	erode	the	political	will	to	pursue	transformations	based	on	
European	models.
3. The Eurasian Union
The	 fact	 that	 the	 European	Union	 is	 currently	 unprepared	 and	
lacks	 the	 political	will	 to	 deepen	 real	 integration	with	 its	 east-
ern	 partners	 is	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 Russia.	 In	 2009	Rus-
sia	 launched	its	own	project	for	Eurasian	integration,	conceived	
of	 as	 competition	 for	 integration	with	 the	EU.	Before	 that,	Rus-
sia’s	strategy	towards	the	Eastern	European	states	was	based	on	
bilateral	action	and	exploited	those	states’	political	and	economic	
dependences	on	it,	which	nevertheless	failed	to	produce	genuine	
integration.	Eurasian	 integration	has	 introduced	a	new	element	
to	Russia’s	 policy.	 Importantly,	Russia’s	 project	 is	 now	based	 on	
common	 legislation	 and	 supranational	 institutions,	 in	which	 it	
resembles	European	integration.	Russia	offers	member	countries	
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various	benefits,	mainly	of	an	economic	nature,	including	easier	
access	to	the	Russian	market,	financial	support	(including	cheap	
loans)	and	preferential	prices	for	energy	resources.	On	the	other	
hand,	it	threatens	to	take	the	preferences	back	if	its	offer	of	inte-
gration	is	declined.	
Unlike	Russia’s	 previous	 initiatives,	 the	Customs	Union	 created	
with	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan,	intended	as	the	first	stage	of	Eura-
sian	integration,	is	gradually	becoming	reality.	The	concrete	re-
sult	of	this	for	EU	policy	is	that	no	broader	economic	integration	
between	Belarus	and	the	Union	will	be	possible,	even	if	the	atti-
tudes	of	the	leadership	in	Minsk	change.	At	stake	is	not	only	the	
possibility	of	creating	a	deep	and	comprehensive	free	trade	area,	
but	 also	 the	 feasibility	 of	 negotiating	 an	 association	 agreement	
(especially	concerning	the	chapters	on	economic	co-operation)39.	
Armenia	 is	 another	 country	 where	 Russia’s	 strong	 dominance	
may	block	real	integration	with	the	EU.	Russia	is	Armenia’s	main	
political	and	security	partner:	it	is	the	country’s	chief	ally	in	its	
conflicts	with	Azerbaijan	and	Turkey,	and	maintains	a	military	
base	in	Giumri.	It	is	also	the	main	economic	partner	as	it	provides	
most	of	the	country’s	investments,	is	the	biggest	trading	partner,	
and	 also	 the	 most	 important	 destination	 for	 migrant	 workers	
from	Armenia,	whose	remittances	account	for	a	major	proportion	
of	income.	Even	though	Armenia	has	started	negotiations	on	the	
association	agreement	and	the	DCFTA,	their	implementation,	or	
even	ratification,	is	very	uncertain	given	the	scale	of	the	country’s	
political	and	economic	dependence	on	Russia.
Russia	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 lobbying	 and	 pressuring	 Ukraine	
and	Moldova,	 the	 two	 countries	most	 committed	 to	 rapproche-
ment	with	the	European	Union,	to	join	the	Eurasian	Union.	The	
choice	to	be	made	by	Ukraine,	the	largest	country	and	the	biggest	
economy	 in	 the	 region	 (accounting	 for	 around	 60%	 of	 the	 total	
39	 Azerbaijan,	which	is	not	a	WTO	member,	has	been	negotiating	an	associa-
tion	agreement	with	the	EU	without	the	DCFTA	part.
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population	of	the	EaP	and	around	55%	of	GDP	PPP	of	all	the	eastern	
partners)	will	be	decisive	 for	 the	success	of	 the	 two	 integration	
projects.	 For	 now,	 continuing	 the	 policy	 of	 balance	 in	 relations	
with	the	European	Union	and	Russia	has	become	an	increasingly	
difficult	 task	 for	 the	Ukrainian	 leadership.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
integration	with	the	EU	remains	the	declared	priority,	and	that	
Ukraine	has	concluded	the	negotiations	of	its	Association	Agree-
ment,	Kyiv	has	repeatedly	signalled	since	late	2012	that	it	is	con-
sidering	the	possibility	of	joining	the	Customs	Union40.	In	view	of	
the	current	crisis	in	Ukraine’s	relations	with	the	Union,	the	dete-
riorating	economic	situation	and	the	intensified	internal	political	
struggles	ahead	of	the	presidential	elections	to	be	held	in	2015,	the	
scenario	of	Ukraine	choosing	integration	with	the	Customs	Union	
cannot	 be	 completely	 ruled	 out.	 And	 while	 its	 eventual	 acces-
sion	to	the	Customs	Union	would	be	very	difficult	to	carry	out	for	
a	variety	of	reasons,	including	legal	obstacles	(the	need	to	amend	
the	country’s	constitution)	and	economic	considerations	(the	eco-
nomic	benefits	would	be	smaller	than	those	offered	by	a	free	trade	
area	with	the	EU41),	Russia	has	very	strong	instruments	at	its	dis-
posal	to	influence	Ukraine,	including	the	ability	to	offer	lower	gas	
prices	or	grant	economic	benefits	without	requiring	any	changes	
to	the	political	system,	which	the	EU	cannot	do.
40	 Tadeusz	 Iwański,	 Rafał	 Sadowski,	 Ukraine:	 between	 the	 European	 Union	
and	the	Customs	Union,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	 12	December	
2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-12-12/ukraine-
between-european-union-and-customs-union
41	 Veronika	Movchan,	Volodymyr	Shportyuk,	Between	 two	unions:	 optimal	
regional	integration	strategy	for	Ukraine,	13th	Annual	Conference	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Trade	Study	Group,	Copenhagen,	August	2011,	http://204.3.197.155/
ETSG2011/Papers/Movchan.pdf
	 In	the	case	of	Moldova,	too,	economic	benefits	from	joining	the	DCFTA	would	
be	greater	than	the	benefits	of	the	Customs	Union.	See	Valeriu	Prohniţchi,	
Strategic	comparison	of	Moldova’s	Integration	options:	Deep	and	Compre-
hensive	Economic	Integration	with	the EU	versus	the	Accession	to	the	Rus-
sia-Belarus-Kazakhstan	Customs	Union,	Economic Analysis and Forecast Pa-
per	Nr.	 3/2012,	Expert-Grup,	Chişinau	2012,	http://pasos.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/06/Moldova-DCFTA_versus_RBK_CU_English.pdf
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vI. cONcluSIONS
1. Limitations of the European Union’s eastern policy
Four	 years	 after	 its	 launch,	 the	 European	 Partnership	 initiative	
has	created	the	frameworks	and	mechanism	for	the	integration	of	
the	EaP	countries	with	the	European	Union.	Despite	that,	it	has	not	
gained	any	major	political	significance	that	would	have	matched	
the	European	Union’s	ambitions	and	the	challenges	ahead	of	it.	The	
impact	of	the	initiative	has	turned	out	to	be	limited	because	of	the	
differences	 of	 interests	 among	 the	 parties	 involved	 (EU	 institu-
tions,	EU	member	states	and	the	partner	countries).	The	progress	
of	transformations	in	the	neighbour	countries	has	fallen	short	of	
expectations,	which	revealed	major	limitations	of	the	EU	and	the	
instruments	it	has	been	using	to	stimulate	change.	The European 
union has failed to become an agent of change in the region to 
the extent that would match its ambitions. The	structures	and	
bureaucratic	instruments	developed	within	the	framework	of	the	
ENP	and	the	EaP	cannot	quickly	respond	to	the	dynamic	political	
processes	taking	place	in	the	Eastern	Europe	and	in	the	EU	itself.	In	
this	situation,	the	real	political	significance	of	the	eastern	neigh-
bours’	integration	with	the	Union	has	been	diminishing,	and	the	
process	itself	has	become	dominated	by	bureaucratic	procedures.	
The parties involved are interested in maintaining dialogue 
rather than achieving measurable progress in integration 
with the Eu.	In	the	European	Union’s	foreign	policy,	including	the	
Eastern	Partnership,	building	internal	consensus	takes	more	time	
and	effort	than	can	be	devoted	to	achieving	tangible	outcomes	out-
side	the	Union.	Where	there	is	no	political	will	to	pursue	deeper	
integration	with	 the	neighbours,	nor	unanimity	 about	 the	 long-
term	objectives	of	integration,	strategic	decisions	and	delivery	on	
specific	commitments	(such	as	abolishing	the	visa	regime)	can	be	
postponed.	The	partner	countries,	on	the	other	hand,	can	use	this	
situation	domestically	to	avoid	paying	the	high	political	and	eco-
nomic	costs	of	real	reforms	and	transformations,	and	externally	to	
pursue	a	policy	of	balancing	between	the	EU	and	Russia.
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currently, a breakthrough in mutual relations seems unlike-
ly to happen in the short term.	The	EU	will	not	reform	its	policy	
towards	the	neighbours	until	it	has	solved	its	internal	problems	
related	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis	 and,	 even	more	 importantly,	 has	
managed	to	streamline	 its	decision-making	processes	and	made	
a	choice	about	the	future	direction	of	its	development.	Moreover,	
the	situation	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood	seems	to	be	relatively	
stable	at	the	moment	and	poses	no	threats	to	the	Union,	as	a	re-
sult	of	which	the	EU	is	not	forced	to	pursue	a	more	active	policy.	
Nor	 are	 the	partner	 countries	 likely	 to	make	major	progress	 in	
implementing	internal	transformations,	which	could	potentially	
be	an	impulse	for	the	EU	to	become	more	involved	in	the	region.	
Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	Moldova,	 regarded	 as	 the	 leader	 among	 the	
EaP	countries,	the	reforms	that	have	been	implemented	are	sub-
ject	to	a	number	of	reservations	(for	example,	the	key	structural	
and	economic	reforms	have	not	yet	been	carried	out)42.	As	deeper	
political	 integration	 does	 not	 seem	 feasible,	 actions	 within	 the	
framework	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	will	focus	on	bureaucratic	
measures	and	the	negotiations	of	individual	agreements	(Associa-
tion	Agreements/DCFTA,	 visa	 liberalisation	deals),	 and	 sectoral	
co-operation	in	those	areas	in	which	the	EU	and	the	partners	have	
shared	interests.
2. Real influence before pressing for changes 
Since	the	European	Union	currently	has	too	 little	 influence	and	
lacks	effective	instruments	to	impose	the	change	it	wants	in	the	
eastern	neighbourhood,	it	would	be	reasonable	to	partly	reformu-
late	 its	approach.	Firstly,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	build	 the	capacity	 to	
genuinely	 influence	the	EaP	countries.	Only	then	will	 it	be	pos-
sible	to	effectively	induce	change,	once	favourable	conditions	for	
42	 For	more	information	on	the	reform	process	in	Moldova,	see	Kamil	Całus,	
Reforms	in	Moldova:	Moderate	progress	and	an	uncertain	outlook	for	the	
future,	 Commentary,	 Centre	 for	 Eastern	 Studies,	 23	 January	 2013,	 http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-01-23/reforms-
moldova-moderate-progress-and-uncertain-outlook-future	
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that	are	in	place	(that	is,	when	the	EU	has	overcome	its	internal	
financial	and	decision-making	crises,	the	economic	situation	im-
proves,	etc.).	Thanks	 to	such	an	approach,	 it	would	also	be	pos-
sible	to	avoid	the	dilemma	about	whether	the	EU	should	stick	to	
its	principles	and	 impose	strict	 conditions,	or	be	pragmatic	and	
pursue	its	self-interest.	The	EU’s	policy	should	combine	these	two	
approaches,	although	the	emphasis	may	shift	depending	on	cur-
rent	conditions.	For	example,	granting	the	EaP	countries	econom-
ic	preferences	that	would	boost	trade	and	investment,	in	return	
for	regulatory	reforms	and	reforms	of	the	judiciary,	would	in	the	
longer	term	also	contribute	to	improvement	in	terms	of	the	rule	of	
law,	and	that	in	turn	would	positively	affect	other	areas,	includ-
ing	democratisation.
In	order	to	prevent	the	dynamics	of	action	under	the	ENP	and	EaP	
from	collapsing,	it	seems	necessary	to	focus	on	three	elements:
1) Intensification of concrete actions that can produce tangible out-
comes in a short time 
It	 is	discouraging	 that	 the	Eastern	Partnership	has	achieved	no	
visible	outcomes	for	the	partner	states	and	their	people	since	its	
launch	in	2009.	The	successive	rounds	of	negotiations	on	the	As-
sociation	Agreements	or	visa	liberalisation	hardly	count	as	such.	
Contrary	 to	 the	 partners’	 expectations,	 the	 Association	 Agree-
ments	and	the	DCFTAs	have	not	been	implemented,	and	the	visa	
regime	has	not	been	abolished.	Even	the	most	advanced	of	the	EaP	
countries	will	only	have	the	chance	to	see	those	objectives	mate-
rialise	first	in	2015–2016,	i.e.	5	to	8	years	after	the	negotiations	first	
started.	
Considering	 this,	 it	 would	 be	 reasonable	 to	 split	 the	 process	 of	
the	EaP	countries’	European	integration	and	the	actions	taken	as	
part	of	it	into	smaller	stages,	so	that	the	partners	have	a	chance	
of	quickly	obtaining	some	measurable	benefits	after	meeting	cer-
tain	groups	of	conditions.	As	a	result,	the	EU	would	be	able	to	step	
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up	its	activities;	the	system	of	incentives	would	become	stronger;	
the	image	of	European	integration	would	improve;	and	most	im-
portantly,	the	threat	of	the	rapprochement	process	getting	stuck	
in	protracted	bureaucratic	procedures	would	be	averted.	For	ex-
ample,	with	 regard	 to	 visa	 liberalisation,	 the	 partner	 countries	
should	be	 granted	 considerable	 facilitations	 (such	as	 abolishing	
visa	 charges,	 or	 considerably	 simplifying	 visa	 issuance	 proce-
dures)	upon	completing	 the	first	phase	of	 their	plan	of	 action43.	
The	same	should	apply	to	other	elements	of	the	Union’s	activities,	
including	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Association	 Agreements,	
association	agendas,	etc.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU	should	to	the	
greatest	 extent	possible	 cut	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 to	make	decisions	
(for	instance,	it	took	the	EU	Council	five	months	to	adopt	the	deci-
sion	allowing	Moldova	into	the	second	phase	of	the	visa	liberalisa-
tion	action	plan44).
2) Focus on key issues and adjusting objectives and actions to the cur-
rent capacity of the EU and its partners
Because	 the	potential	 of	 the	EU	administration	 and,	 even	more	
importantly,	of	the	partner	states	is	limited,	it	is	important	to	fo-
cus	on	selected	priorities	and	implement	actions	on	a	step-by-step	
basis.	States	and	societies	cannot	undergo	fast	and	deep	transfor-
mations	in	all	areas	at	the	same	time.	The	question	of	visa	liberali-
sation	is	a	case	in	point:	in	addition	to	the	technical	and	security	
requirements,	it	is	also	conditional	on	the	partner	countries’	per-
formance	in	other	areas,	such	as	the	adoption	of	anti-discrimina-
tion	laws,	a	matter	which	has	considerably	prolonged	the	entire	
visa	liberalisation	procedure.	
43	 The	 visa	 liberalisation	 process	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 phases:	 preparations,	
during	which	the	reforms	and	legislative	changes	are	elaborated,	and	im-
plementation,	when	the	reforms	are	carried	out.	For	details,	see	Marta	Jaro-
szewicz,	Making	the	impossible	possible,	op.cit.,	p.	22–23.	
44	 Rafał	Sadowski,	EU	visa	liberalisation:	success	for	Moldova,	slow	progress	
for	Ukraine,	Eastweek,	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies,	28	November	2012,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-11-28/eu-visa-liberalisa-
tion-success-moldova-slow-progress-ukraine	
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Three	objectives	appear	to	be	of	crucial	importance	at	this	stage:	
a)	 economic	 integration;	 (b)	 bringing	 the	 societies	 of	 the	 EaP	
countries	closer	to	Europe	by	abolishing	the	visa	regime	and	pro-
moting	mobility;	(c)	strengthening	state	institutions	and	building	
administrative	capacity	in	the	partner	countries.	By	focusing	on	
these	areas,	the	European	Union	could	better	use	the	limited	re-
sources	available,	making	the	entire	policy	more	effective.	Block-
ing	or	slowing	down	progress	in	these	key	issues,	either	for	politi-
cal	or	for	bureaucratic	reasons,	will	undermine	the	chances	of	the	
entire	European	integration	process	succeeding.	Achieving	con-
crete	progress	in	those	areas,	on	the	other	hand,	will	enable	the	
EU	to	effectively	influence	other	spheres,	in	particular	respect	for	
democratic	values	and	the	rule	of	law.	
3) Creation of an EU investment fund
There	are	at	least	two	arguments	for	making	the	creation	of	such	
a	 fund	 a	 priority.	 Firstly,	 economic	 co-operation	 benefits	 both	
sides,	and	the	gains	may	even	be	greater	for	the	EU	countries	and	
business	than	for	the	EaP	side.	Secondly,	economic	integration	and	
the	creation	of	a	Deep	And	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	would	
truly	bind	the	partner	countries	with	the	EU	and	strengthen	the	
Union’s	instruments	of	influence.	The	fund	could	also	become	an	
effective	instrument	stimulating	change	in	the	other	areas,	such	
as	in	social	life	and	politics.	
The	European	Union	is	attractive	to	its	partners	not	because	of	its	
model	of	governance,	its	democratic	system	of	power	or	its	politi-
cal	 clout,	 but	because	 of	 its	financial	 capacity,	new	 technologies	
and	the	potential	 it	offers	 for	business	co-operation.	The	actions	
taken	 so	 far	 in	 this	 area,	 including	 the	 negotiations	 concerning	
the	 Association	 Agreements	 and	 the	 DCFTAs,	 and	 the	 creation	
of	instruments	to	support	business	and	investments	(such	as	the	
programmes	of	 the	European	 Investment	Bank	and	 the	Europe-
an	Bank	 for	Reconstruction	and	Development,	 the	Eastern	Part-
ners	Facility,	the	Neighbourhood	Investment	Facility,	and	the	EaP	
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flagship	initiative	for	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises45)	were	
steps	in	the	right	direction,	but	have	failed	to	substantially	change	
the	character	of	mutual	economic	relations46.	An	important	prob-
lem	 in	 this	 regard	 concerns	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 partner	 countries’	
markets	 are	 relatively	 unattractive	 to	 companies	 from	 the	 EU,	
a	fact	which	has	a	number	of	underlying	causes	including	the	busi-
ness	climate	in	the	partner	countries,	but	also	lack	of	knowledge	
about	the	region.	Establishing	an	EU	investment	fund	for	the	east-
ern	neighbourhood	would	offer	a	solution	to	this	problem.	
This	fund	could	be	financed	by	the	EU	financial	institutions,	the	
budgets	of	the	member	states,	private	capital,	or	perhaps	also	the	
EU	budget.	Its	aim	would	be	to	carry	out	various	investment	pro-
jects	 in	 the	 partner	 countries,	 ranging	 from	 micro-projects	 to	
large	 investments	 spread	 over	 several	 years.	 Furthermore,	 the	
fund	could	finance	projects	from	different	areas	and	sectors	of	the	
economy.	 Its	 activities	 could	 extend	 to	 infrastructural	 projects,	
undertakings	in	the	private	equity	and	venture	capital	markets,	
and	 business-incubator	 activities.	 The	 fund	would	 not	 only	 in-
vest	money,	but	–	 thanks	 to	 the	 involvement	of	 its	managers	 in	
the	projects	being	financed	–	could	also	contribute	to	the	transfer	
of	state-of-the-art	management	methods	and,	in	this	way,	to	the	
training	of	local	managers.	
The	fund	would	offer	three	main	categories	of	benefits.	Firstly,	it	
would	increase	investments	in	the	countries	experiencing	invest-
ment	shortages,	which	constitute	a	serious	obstacle	to	stimulating	
transformations	 and	 economic	 development.	 Secondly,	 it	would	
be	more	effective	than	the	instruments	used	hitherto	in	promot-
ing	 the	 development	 of	 innovative	 sectors	 and	 industries,	 and	
transfers	of	 technologies	and	state-of-the-art	business	adminis-
tration	methods.	In	this	way,	it	would	facilitate	a	more	effective	
45	 For	more	information	see:	EaPCommunity,	Work	with	EU,	For	private	sec-
tor,	http://www.easternpartnership.org/work-with-eu/private-sector
46	 Described	in	chapters	II.2.	and	II.3	of	this	paper.
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transformation	of	the	post-Soviet	economies	into	modern	market	
economies.	 Finally,	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 fund	would	 financially	
benefit	all	 sides	 (investors	 from	the	EU	countries	and	entrepre-
neurs	 from	 the	 partner	 countries),	while	 the	 partner	 countries	
would	gain	additionally	from	the	transfer	of	business	know-how	
and	 new	 technologies.	 The	 fund	 could	 also	 stimulate	 market-
oriented	institutional	and	legal	changes	in	the	EaP	countries.	Its	
profits	could	be	used	to	finance	new	business	projects	in	the	east-
ern	neighbourhood,	which	 in	 the	 longer	 term	would	reduce	 the	
cost	of	the	Union’s	financial	assistance.	
The	creation	of	this	kind	of	instrument	would	strengthen	the	EU’s	
image	 as	 an	 important	 business	 partner	 and	 could	 attract	 local	
business	elites.	This	also	applies	to	those	states	and	areas	which	are	
currently	less	interested	in	co-operation	with	the	EU,	such	as	Bela-
rus,	or	possibly	even	breakaway	regions	such	as	Transnistria47.
rafał SadOWSKI
Work on this text finished in May 2013
47	 The	author	would	like	to	thank	Lyndon	Allin	for	an	inspiring	conversation	
on	the	subject.
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